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ILLINOIS RECONSIDERS "FLAT TIME": AN ANALYSIS OF
THE IMPACT OF THE JUSTICE MODEL
,PATRICK D. MCANANY*
FRANK S. MERRITT**
EDWARD TROMANHAUSER* * *
Legislation has been introduced which would return Illinois to "flat
time" prison sentences.' Though there is popular confusion as to the exact
meaning of this term, 2 to professionals in law and corrections it proposes a
return to a system that Illinois and most other states abandoned at the turn
of the century.3 The proposal represents a growing sentiment throughout
the country by the very professionals who for years have accepted the
indeterminate sentence and parole as a given of the criminal justice system.4
It seems likely that the major shift from indeterminate to determinate
sentencing will occupy the Illinois General Assembly and other legislatures in
debate for some years to come. It is the purpose of this article to examine
in detail the proposals of the Justice Model bills and indicate the changes
they will introduce.
The first section summarizes the criticisms which have overtaken the
present system of indeterminate sentencing. It has been a gradual, historical
* Associate Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois,
Chicago Circle Campus. J.D., Harvard University, 1960.
* * General Counsel, Prisoners Legal Assistance and Visiting Assistant Professor
of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle Campus. J.D., Case Western
Reserve University, 1968.
• ** Assistant Director, Center for Corrections, Chicago State University. M.A. in
Criminal Justice, University of Illinois, 1975.
1. Governor Walker introduced the package of legislation under the title of
"Justice Model" in his State of the State address in January, 1975. The title "Justice
Model" is taken from D. FoG.L, WE ARE Tim LiviNG PROOF: THE JusncE MODEL FOR
CORREcrMONs 204 (1975) [hereinafter cited as FoGF]. Dr. Fogel has served as the
chairman of the drafting committee for the proposed legislation. He serves as the
Executive Director of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. The text of the bills is
taken from the most recent drafts dated February, 1976 which may be subject to further
change. From an examination of all drafts over the past year, the authors have found a
high degree of consistency and consider the present drafts as final.
This article will discuss three portions of the legislative package: A Bill to Re-
establish Determinate Sentencing, S. 1885, 79th Sess. (April 19, 1976); A Bill to
Establish Sentence Equalization, S. 1888, 79th Sess. (April 19, 1976); A Bill to Establish
the Bureau of Community Safety, S. 1882, 79th Sess. (April 19, 1976).
2. For instance, many people seem to think that flat time sentences mean manda-
tory prison sentences.
3. For a criticism and definition of indeterminate sentences, see S. RuaiN, THE
LAw OF CPJMINAL CORRECTION 157-69 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as RUBiN];
Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm, 123 U.
PENN. L. REv. 297 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz].
4. Note, Statutory Structures For Sentencing Felons To Prison, 60 COLUM. L
REV. 1134, 1159-69 (1960).
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process in which the weaknesses of the system have worked their way into
public view. The shocking disparity in sentences imposed on convicted
felons, which results in long prison terms for some and brief periods of
probation for others, lies at the heart of the problem.
A review of several major issues which the Justice Model bills raise in
regard to present sentencing and corrections structure follows the first
section. The introduction of sentencing criteria, flat time prison terms, and
appellate review of sentences will be considered. This section also discusses
the abolition of parole, the impact of determinate sentences on size of prison
population and the interrelated issues of good time, discipline, and grievance
procedures. Finally, the effect of determinate sentences on programs and
the de-emphasis on rehabilitation is examined.
The final section summarizes the critique of the Justice Model bills and
presents some suggested alternatives to Justice Model proposals which the
authors consider critical for improvement over present structure.
SOME HISTORICAL NOTES ON THE DECLINE OF
THE INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
The indeterminate sentence which is being questioned today by a wide
spectrum of critics5 has been the cornerstone of American corrections since
the turn of the century. It consists of a prison term whose maximum and
minimum are set to provide a period during which a releasing authority may
act.6 The indeterminate term reflects the discretion to release which resides
in the authority, usually a parole board.7 Opposed to this is the determinate,
or flat time, sentence in which only a maximum term is set.8 Its name
5. The group of critics is expanding rapidly and the listing we give is only partial,
but it represents persons with substantial reputation in the field of criminal justice law.
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971) [hereinafter cited as STRUGGLE FOR JusTICE];
FOGEL, supra note 1, at 238-49; McGee, A New Look at Sentencing Part 1, 38 FED.
PROB. 3 (June 1974); McGee, A New Look at Sentencing Part II: A Plan for Maximum
Justice with Minimum Capriciousness, 38 FED. PROB. 3 (Sept. 1974); J. MrTFORD, KIND
AND USUAL PUNISHMENT: Tim PRIsoN BUSINESS (1973) [hereinafter cited as MrrFoRD];
N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974) [hereinafter cited as MoRIus]; L.
ORLAND, PRISONS: HOUSES OF DARKNESS (1975) [hereinafter cited as ORLAND]; J.Q.
WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975) [hereinafter cited as WILSON].
6. An exact definition of the indeterminate sentence is difficult to fashion since
there are a number of variations by which states achieve the indeterminacy. See RUBIN,
supra note 3, at 159. All systems essentially provide for a period of time during which
the prisoner may be released on a discretionary basis.
7. All states currently have parole boards which function both in the capacity of
releasing authorities and frequently as agencies which review and recommend clemency
to the governors. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 622-24.
8. As noted above in the text following note 2 supra, there is a lack of
understanding of the distinction between a determinate sentence and a mandatory one.
An example of a sentence which is mandatory and yet not determinate is the sentence for
murder in Illinois. Illinois law requires a prison sentence in murder cases. ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)(1) (1975). But because the statute provides for a fourteen
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derives from the fact that the maximum is the term the prisoner will have to
serve.
Prior to the development of the indeterminate sentence in Illinois in
1897,9 two other early release devices, parole and good time, had been
devised. These were combined with the setting of maximum-minimum
terms to form the indeterminate sentence system in effect today. As early as
1863, Illinois introduced a schedule of diminutions from prison terms for
good behavior (thus the term "good time"), discretionary on judgment of the
warden.10 This was thought of as an incentive to prisoners to conform to
institutional discipline and provided some relief from the harsh prison terms
established by law and meted out by judges. Parole, introduced in 1867 for
young offenders'" and 1895 for adults,' 2 was the early release of prisoners
considered good risks, again on recommendation of the warden. Inmates
released to the community were still considered prisoners and subject to be
returned at any time for violation of conditions placed on their release from
prison. This power to release early was a modified type of executive
clemency which the governor exercised on advice of the wardens.' 3 Again,
it was intended both as an incentive for good behavior and a mitigation of
harsh sentences.
These two early ameliorative remedies were found inadequate by
themselves for the correctional philosophy that was developing. While
rehabilitation had been an ideal of the Anglo-American criminal justice
system for several centuries, it was not promoted as a goal until after the
middle of the nineteenth century.' 4 The Positivist School of Criminology in
Italy proposed that restraint and rehabilitation replace punishment as the
goal of criminal law.' 5  It was believed that since human behavior in
year.minimum term and no fixed maximum, the sentence is not determinate. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1 (b)(1) (1975). Under the Justice Model murder would be
both mandatory and determinate, i.e. with a fixed term such as 25 years. Proposed ILL.
R v. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)(1) and § 1005-8-1(b)(1).
9. Act of April 21, 1899, Ill. Laws 1899, 142. For an excellent review of this
development, see Bruce, Burgess & Harno, A Study of the Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole in the State of Illinois, 19 J. CluM. L & CRIMINOLOGY I No. 1, Part II (1928)
[hereinafter cited as Bruce]. This comprehensive study was undertaken as part of a
review of sentencing policy and parole by the State of Illinois.
10. Act of March 19, 1872, Ill. Laws 1871-72, 294. For commentary, see Bruce,
supra note 9, at 48-49.
11. Act of March 5, 1867, § 17, Ill. Laws 1867, 42. For commentary, see Bruce,
supra note 9, at 42-43, 50.
12. Act of June 15, 1895, Ill. Laws 1895, 158.
13. For the legal history of the attempt to conceptualize the constitutional line
between the power of the governor to pardon and the legislature to establish penalties
for offenses, see RUBIN, supra note 3, at 624-25.
14. One of the major watersheds was the "Declaration of Principles" at the
Congress of 1870. TRANSAcONS OF THE NATIONAL CONGRESS ON PRISON AND
REFORMATORY DISCIPLINE 1-8 (1871; reprinted 1970). An excerpt of the "Declaration of
Principles" is reprinted at FOGEL, supra note 1, at 32-34.
15. L. RAD2 owiOz, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 53-59 (1966).
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general was reducible to deterministic causes and subject to scientific inquiry
in such new fields as psychology and sociology, criminal behavior was subject
to similar scientific analysis. This provided a knowledge base for what had
been a sentiment of humanitarianism expressed by prison reformers. Quick-
ly, the new philosophy of rehabilitation and social defense was absorbed by a
system eager for an answer to the difficult problems of crime and correc-
tions.1'6
For sentencing, the key concept was individualization.1 7 There was a
need to discover as much as possible about the behavior and background of
individual offenders in order to sentence them to appropriate treatment. In
terms of prison sentences, there was no need-indeed very little sense-in
sentencing all offenders to similar terms simply because they had committed
similar offenses.' 8 Each offender was to be judged on the basis of the
danger which he presented to the community, that is, the likelihood that he
would commit another offense. Since the court had little time or training for
this sort of determination, it was felt that the widest margin of time should be
provided during which experts could determine what had caused the offend-
er to commit crime, the likelihood that he would undertake future criminal
activity and the program best suited to rectify the problem. Thus was born
the indeterminate sentence in which the court selected a minimum and
maximum sentence based on considerations of punishment, leaving the
actual release date to the parole board, pursuing goals of restraint and
rehabilitation.
This approach satisfied several system needs at once. The public was
comforted by still impressive maximum sentences, while being assured that
release after the minimum term was controlled by scientific experts. The
prison warden was given a control mechanism beyond mere good time, since
his negative recommendation to the parole board assured denial of release.
The social reformer was confident that the incentive of early release would
push most prisoners into rehabilitative programs, thus coercing them to a
virtue that had escaped them previously. Finally, the social scientist had a
natural field experiment for isolating and identifying the causes of crime and
recidivism.' 9 That these explicit and implicit functions of the new system
16. For critical evaluation of the effect that such absorption had on the system, see
Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CarM. L.C.
& P.S. 226 (1959).
17. RUDiN, supra note 3, at 134-36; Dershowitz, supra note 3, at 304-15.
18. For an example of such an approach, see NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIMM AND
DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING Acr (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
SENTENCING Acr].
19. All of these expectations are reflected in the 1927 study cited at note 9 supra.
In assessing the indeterminate sentence and parole structure in Illinois, the panel of
experts gave what may have been the sustaining thrust to the present system. It was the
last time that the basic structure in Illinois was so carefully examined. Professor
Burgess offered a classic statement for the social scientist in Burgess, Can Scientific
Method Be Applied To Parole Administration? 19 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY at 283-
86. He answers his question with a modest but firm "Yes."
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were frequently frustrated by the vagaries of history seemed not to deter
the indeterminate sentencing concept from gaining widespread popularity
and support. Indeed, it became the defining element of felony corrections
and was sustained until the present by all of those social forces which had a
vested interest in it.
20
The repudiation of the indeterminate sentence has barely achieved
respectability. It is too early to say whether its critics will have their day.
But the criticism has been sharp and -the critics widely dispersed on the
social spectrum. 21 To date, no one has attempted a comprehensive restate-
ment of their charges, and the following is only a sketch of several of their
themes.
'First, the critics all agree the problem of goal conflict implicit in the
indeterminate sentence has never been resolved. 22  On the one hand,
restraint and rehabilitation are based on non-punitive theories of justice, akin
to social welfare. On the other, prison sentences bespeak a punitive
purpose. One cannot ignore the conflict implicit in a system in which a man
is punished while being told that he is receiving help or, put another way,
that he is being punished for past crimes but will not 'be released because of
possible future ones.
The critics also point out that even if the system concentrated on a
determination of dangerousness, as the parole boards certainly seem to do,
there is no adequate way to predict what individual offenders will do in the
future.23  While there are certain factors which have been isolated that in
global terms have predictive relevance,2 4 these are far from accurate and
leave room for margins of error intolerable when dealing with human
freedom. The other side of the coin is the failure of rehabilitation. If
programs could be created which would reduce recidivism for persons
released from prisons, perhaps the failure in prediction of dangerousness
could be disregarded. But studies have begun to demonstrate what many
had thought, that rehabilitation programs when seriously evaluated produced
insignificant results in reduced recidivism. 25  Thus, the hope of social
control exercised through the mechanism of indeterminate sentence and
parole release is false.
20. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 20-33.
21. See note 5 supra.
22. See, e.g., MoIs, supra note 5, at 18-20.
23. Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIATRY 397 (1972); MORRIS, supra note 5, at 62-73; STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra
note 5, at 76-82.
24. Kozol, Boucher, Garafalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,
18 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 371 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kozol]. For an evaluation
of parole prediction methods, see GOTrREDSON, FOUR THOUSAND LIFETIMES: A STUDY OF
TIME SERVED AND PAROLE OUTCOMES (1973).
25. Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35
PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); Serrill, Is Rehabilitation Dead? 1 CORRECTIONS 3 (1975). For
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A third common theme shared by critics is the result of the failure of
parole on inmates. 26 They perceive the arbitrariness of the decision-maker.
Since the parole board member has no real guidelines, he falls back on
conservative instincts for punishment and protection of the public. But he
speaks in terms of rehabilitation. The hypocrisy of this double-talk is not lost
on inmates who rebel under prolonged denial of release without being told
the reasons for this denial. Prison riots could possibly be an expression of
this frustration.
27
All of this criticism has support among widely divergent groups in the
community. The conservative element sees in the present system a weak-
ness in favor of early release by parole boards and wishes to do away with
this loophole for crime. 28 On the other hand, radical theorists see in the
indeterminate system a covert way for a dominant society to control minori-
ties.
29
Many of the critics go on to point out that the system also rests on
discretionary powers placed elsewhere than the parole board. Prosecutors
enjoy tremendous powers to bind and loose, especially in plea bargaining
where disparity is bound to result. 30 Further, judges who are not constricted
by agreed-to-bargains wield broad powers of choice, ranging from fines and
unsupervised release to severe prison terms, all for the same offense. 31
Since judges have few if any guides in the exercise of this discretion, disparity
is inevitable.
The determinate sentence appears to many critics to be a satisfactory
answer to the problems. It would eliminate the necessity for a parole
decision. It would give a narrower range of choice against which both the
prosecutor and judge would exercise their discretion. It would provide a
solution to the goal-conflict issue by resolving it in favor of punishment. 'It
would thereby provide offenders with a better sense of certainty and justice
since all would be treated in a similar manner.
SOME MAJOR ISSUES IN THE JUSTICE MODEL'S FLAT TIME PROPOSAL
The Justice Model bills propose a return to determinate sentences for
Illinois. While other changes are also proposed, the return to flat time is
a defense of the rehabilitative approach, see Palmer, Martinson Revisited, 12 J.
RESEARCH IN CRIM. & DELINQUENCY 133 (1975).
26. FOGEL, supra note 1, at 122-26; THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA (1972) [hereinafter cited as ATI'cA REPORT].
27. For a discussion of the frustrating aspects of the indeterminate sentence on
prisoners, see STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 93-96.
28. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING A VERY OLD AND
PAINFUL QUESTION 161, 177 (1975).
29. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 145-53.
30. MORRIS, supra note 5, at 45-47, 50-57.
31. For a discussion of the judicial sentencing processes, see generally M. FVANKEL,
CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WrrIHOUT ORDER (1973).
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central and thematic. 82  The bills thus make more explicit legislative policy
choices regarding sentencing alternatives, narrow judges' discretion by creat-
ing guidelines for choice of alternatives and create flat time prison terms with
narrow margins of flexibility. They further provide broader appellate
review of sentences and abolish parole. They offer an increased use of good
time, provide improved disciplinary hearings, and eliminate rehabilitation as
a goal of imprisonment. It is these major changes which will be the subject
of the analysis in the present part of the article.
Sentencing: Narrowing the Scope of Judicial Discretion
Sentencing Criteria
Judges in Illinois presently have a broad range of choices in selecting a
sentencing alternative for offenders. 3 3  For most serious offenses, the judge
may choose among alternatives that run from terms of imprisonment,
periodic imprisonment, probation, and conditional discharge to fines.3 4 The
problem with this range of alternatives is that it invites disparity of outcome.
Thus, a burglar may be sentenced to a maximum term of imprisonment of
6 to 20 years, or to a few days of unsupervised release in the community.3 5
Inevitably disparity lurks in such broad choices.
The Code of Corrections of 1973 created a new system of penalty
structure and sentencing.36 Prior Illinois law had penalties defined for each
32. The Justice Model bills have tended to include different things at different
times. In the 1975 version of Justice Model legislation, the package included such things
as bail reform, grand jury reform, support for public defender offices, as well as the three
basic reforms of return to determinate sentencing, creation of appellate review of
sentences, and creation of a Bureau of Community Safety. Letter from the Springfield
Office of the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission, February, 1975. The central lines
of the reforms intended are outlined in Dr. Fogel's book. FOGEL, supra note 1, at 209'-
265. It should be noted that many notions for the improvement of prison life, as
suggested by Fogel, are not part of the Justice Model bills. The explanation which the
drafters give for these omissions is that they require administrative rather than statutory
changes.
33. Illinois provides six basic penalties for criminal offenses: death, imprisonment,
periodic imprisonment, probation, conditional discharge, and fines. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-5-3 (1975). The death penalty currently is unavailable because of the recent
Illinois Supreme Court ruling in People ex rel. Rice v. Cunningham, 61 Ill. 2d 353, 336
N.E.2d 1 (1975).
34. There are certain limitations on the use of probation or periodic imprisonment
for felony sentences. Murder and certain class 1 felonies (rape, armed robbery, armed
violence, and narcotics sales) are excluded. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)(1)
(1975). Probation is also prohibited for class 1 felonies committed while on probation
or conditional discharge for a prior felony conviction. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
3(g) (1975). Fines may not be used as the sole disposition for felony offenses. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)(3) (1975).
35. Burglary is a class 2 offense, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1(b) (1975), for
which the term of imprisonment is 1-20 years. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b)(3)
(1975). Such an offender may be placed on conditional discharge for any length of
time up to 5 years, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-2(b)(1) (1975), with the ability in
the court to discharge at any time. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-2(c) (1975).
36. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 et seq. (1975). See also 38 S.H.A. § 1005-
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substantive offense which roughly reflected the seriousness of that offense.
That meant, however, that there were as many penalties as there were
crimes, each slightly different from another. There was no relationship
among penalties, and disparity was encouraged since legislators defined or
reformed offenses separately and attached new penalties to them. The
purpose of the nine-grade classification system3 7 which the Code of Correc-
tions introduced was to produce some uniformity in grading for serious-
ness.
38
But having achieved that reform, the Code went on to create a very
broad category of alternative penalties attached to each classification. Thus,
apart from fines, any of the other sentencing alternatives were available for
any felony offense, except five of the most serious offenses.3 9 The judge
was now able to tell which general grade of seriousness the offense fell into,
but he was still allowed-indeed, forced-to choose among alternatives.
The Code offered several control mechanisms to channel the judge's
choice. First, it intended to make probation the preferred sentencing choice,
though the language of the statute as drafted was ambiguous. 40 It also
excluded fines as a sole disposition for felony offenses. 41  Further, it
excluded five major offenses from probation, thus mandating prison terms.
42
These were all legislative choices imposed on the judges. But the central
control mechanism for sentence selection was the "informational base" which
the Code provided.
Under the Code, the philosophy of rehabilitation was pursued." The
ideal was to individualize sentences according to the circumstances of each
case. The "informational base" for such individualization lay in the presen-
5-1, 316 (1973) for Council Commentary on this section !hereinafter cited as Council
Commentary].
37. The classification in order of seriousness is: murder; felony classes 1, 2, 3, and
4; misdemeanor classes A, B, and C; and petty and business offenses (violations). ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-1 (1975).
38. Pusateri & Scott, Illinois' New Unified Code of Corrections, 61 ILL. B.J. 62, 69
(1972).
39. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (1975), with limits as noted in note 34
supra.
40. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (1975). But the language appears to
require the judge to make a finding based on evidence that a prison sentence, rather than
probation, is required. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 (a).
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d) (3) (1975).
42. See note 34 supra.
43. The Code of Corrections of 1973 was based largely on the work of the
American Bar Association, contained in STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERN-
ATIVES AND PROCEDURES (1968) [hereinafter cited as SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES]. This
report was itself an extension of the indeterminate sentencing philosophy. Id. at § 2.1.
For a helpful comparison of the Illinois statutes and the American Bar standards, see S.
SCHILLER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ILLINOIS COMPLIANCE (1974) [hereinafter cited as SCHILLER].
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tence reports44 and sentencing hearings 45 at which all relevant information
in mitigation and aggravation was brought forward, tested, and entered into
the record.4 6  The judge, apprised of all of this, was then to make his
selection. The original draft of the Code added a duty to state the reasons
for selection of any term of imprisonment, but it was later stricken.4 7  The
theory was that most judges would make similar sentencing choices when
provided with adequate information. 'Disparity arose because judges were
not equally well-informed.
The Justice Model accepts the basic framework of present judicial
sentencing in Illinois. It amends the law, however, in several crucial
aspects. First, it provides for a wider scope of presentence reports.48  It
eliminates the right of the defendant to waive a presentence report, a
practice which apparently is common among felony defendants who have
entered into a plea bargain.49  Further, presentence reports are mandated,
not only for felony offense sentences, but for any sentence of imprisonment
of 90 days or more.5 0 Thus, if a judge decides to sentence a misdemeanant
to 90 days, he would have to order a presentence report. The quality of the
reports should improve since probation officers attached to the courts will be
relieved of supervision of probationers by the Justice Model.5 1
A second major amendment is the requirement that judges follow stated
criteria of mitigation and aggravation when selecting a sentencing alterna-
44. The Code requires that a presentence investigation and written report be made
in all felony cases and that the report be made available to the parties. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-3-1 (1975) (requirement of report for all felony cases); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 1005-3-4 (1975) (disclosure of report to parties).
45. The sentencing hearing specified a broad range of information which the court
was to invite or order: presentence reports, evidence from trial, other information
offered in mitigation and aggravation, sentencing proposals from the parties, and words
from the defendant. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1 (1975).
46. The record did not make the presentence report itself a public document
accessible to the public, though it was part of the record for review. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1005-3-4 (1975).
47. One of the authors served as Reporter for the Code of Corrections from 1969-
71. The rationale given for the removal of the requirement to state reasons for the
imposition of a prison sentence was the feeling among judges that such reasons could not
be adequately expressed and that there were no guidelines for them. The recommenda-
tion of such a requirement was drawn from the American Bar Association's Standards.
SENTENCiNo ALTERNATIVES, supra note 43, at § 2.4(c).
48. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-1.
49. Id. The practice of waiver of presentence reports in Illinois is based on
discussion that the authors have had with various court personnel from a variety of
circuits. We know of no published documentation of the extent of this practice, but
estimates range upwards to 90% of all felony pleas.
50. Id.
51. The Bureau of Community Safety would be created as a division of the
Department of Corrections and would provide a statewide agency directed to the
supervision of probationers in local communities, Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1006-5-1. For text, see note 169 infra. This would free the probation officers currently
attached to the circuit courts of the State to devote full time to the preparation of
presentence reports.
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tive.52  This is new to Illinois and, indeed, a feature that few if any
jurisdictions now have.53 There are eleven listed factors of mitigation which
tend to reflect such common sense elements as provocation by victim,
situational reaction by defendant, and the like, all pointing to an offender
who is not dangerous. 54  On the aggravation side, there are four criteria.
The first two indicate a highly dangerous (physically violent) offender.55
The third is an habitual offender criterion (one or more repeated separated
52. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1 (mitigation); .§ 1005-5-3.2 (ag-
gravation).
53. Though recommended as early as 1968 by the American Bar Association,
SENTENCING ALTERNAITVES, supra note 43, at § 2.5(c) and commentary "0" and since,
FRANKEL, supra note 31, at 113, only New York has adopted anything similar. NEW
YORK PENAL CODE § 65.00(1) (1968).
54. Factors in Mitigation.) (a) The following grounds shall be accorded
weight in favor of withholding a sentence of imprisonment;
(1) the defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened seri-
ous harm;
(2) the defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would
cause or threaten serious harm;
(3) the defendant acted under a strong provocation;
(4) there were substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the de-
fendant's criminal conduct, though failing to establish a defense;
(5) the victim of the defendant's criminal conduct induced or facilitated
its commission;
(6) the defendant has compensated or will compensate the victim of his
criminal conduct for the damage or injury that he sustained;
(7) the defendant has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity
or has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the com-
mission of the present crime;
(8) the defendant's criminal conduct was the result of circumstances un-
likely to recur;
(9) the character and attitudes of the defendant indicate that he is un-
likely to commit another crime;
(10) the defendant is particularly likely to comply with the terms of
a period of mandatory supervision;
(11) the imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship
to him or to his dependents.
Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1. These criteria are borrowed almost ver-
batim from the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2) (1962).
55. Factors in Aggravation.) (a) The following factors shall be accorded
weight in favor of imposing a term of imprisonment, and in the instances
specified shall mandate a term of imprisonment.
(1) that in the commission of a felony offense, or in flight therefrom,
the defendant inflicted or attempted to inflict serious bodily injury to another.
"Serious bodily injury" as used in this Section means bodily injury which
creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or serious disfigure-
ment, serious impairment of health, or serious loss or impairment of the func-
tion of any bodily organ.
(2) that the defendant presents a continuing risk of physical harm to
the public. If the court so finds, it shall impose a sentence of a term of
imprisonment and in addition finds the factors specified in subsection (a)(1)
of this Section are present, and that an additional period of confinement is
required for the protection of the public, the defendant may be sentenced
as provided in Section 5-8-2(a) of this Code whether or not the defendant
has a prior felony conviction. However, a sentence under that Section shall
not be imposed unless the defendant was at least 17 years of age at the
time he committed the offense for which sentence is to be imposed.
Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)(1) & (2).
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felony offenses) . 6  The fourth is a violation of trust criterion.5 7  These
four factors not only serve to aggravate the sentence, but in the case of the
habitual offender mandate the choice of prison. 58 In addition, persons
found to present a continuing risk of physical harm and habitual offenders
may have their sentences increased by use of the same criteria. 59
Under the Justice Model the judge must support his selection of a
sentencing alternative and its particular severity by citing in the record what
evidence he used and what weight he gave to it.60 This all must be done by
an "independent" assessment of the evidence, indicating that judges must
disregard prearranged bargains between prosecutor and defense counsel.
61
56. (3) that the defendant is a repeat offender whose commitment for an
extended term is necessary for the protection of the public. A defendant
of this type shall have sentence imposed pursuant to Section 5-8-2 of this
Code. Provided, however, a sentence shall not be imposed pursuant to this
Section unless:
(A) the defendant was at least 17 years of age at the time he committed
the offense for which sentence is to be imposed;
(B) the defendant has been convicted of at least one other class 1 or
class 2 felony or two or more lesser felony offenses within the 5 years ini-
mediately preceding commission of the instant offense, excluding time spent
in custody for violation of the laws of any state or of the United States.
Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a) (3).
57. (4) that the defendant committed a felony offense that occurred under
one or more of the following circumstances:
(A) the defendant, by the duties of his office or by his position, was
obliged to prevent the particular offense committed or to bring the offenders
committing it to justice;
(B) the defendant held public office at the time of the offense, and
the offense related to the conduct of that office;
(C) the defendant utilized his professional reputation or position in the
community to commit the offense; or to afford him an easier means of com-
mitting it, in circumstances where his example probably would influence the
conduct of others.
Proposed ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a) (4).
58. "A defendant of this type shall have sentence imposed pursuant to Section
5-8-2 of this Code [imprisonment]." Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2(a)
(3) (emphasis added).
59. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2 states:
Sec. 5-8-2. Extended Term-Dangerous or Repeat Offenders.) (a) When-
ever the court, pursuant to subparagraphs (a) (2) and (a) (3) of Section 5-5-
3.2 of this Code, finds that a felony offender should serve an extended term of
imprisonment, the following schedules of sentences shall be applicable:
(1) For the conviction of a class 1 felony, the term of imprisonment
shall be 15 years, with up to 3 years added or subtracted for aggravating or
mitigating circumstances;
(2) For the conviction of a class 2 felony, the term of imprisonment
shall be 9 years, with up to 2 years added or subtracted for aggravating or
mitigating circumstances;
(3) For the conviction of a class 3 or class 4 felony, the term of im-
prisonment shall be 6 years, with up to 2 years added or subtracted for ag-
ravating or mitigating circumstances.
60. In imposing a sentence for commission of a felony offense, or a sentence
to a term of imprisonment for commission of a misdemeanor, in excess of
90 days, the trial judge shall specify on the record the particular evidence,
information or factors that weighed most heavily in his sentencing determina-
tion, including insofar as practical the weight given those various elements.
Proposed ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(c).
61. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-4-1(b). For such an explanation, see
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In making its reforms, the Justice Model recognizes that present Illinois
structure invites disparity of sentencing outcome. It attacks the problem,
however, by imposing criteria on selection of sentence and by making prison
sentences more certain as to length, and ignores the real villain of
disparity-plea bargaining. 62  While it is true that judges enjoy enormous
discretion in selection of sentence, in many circuits this discretion is eliminat-
ed in up to 90 percent of serious cases by plea bargains conducted without
direct judicial control. Thus, the Model may be suggesting an exercise in
futility.
Assuming that a significant number of cases do depend on judicial
selection of sentences, the question arises as to the effect the criteria will
have. While one may admire the drafters of the Model for attempting a
new and needed reform, one cannot fail to recognize several serious blun-
ders. First, both sets of criteria are exclusive and mandatory, indicating that
judges cannot look to other factors in deciding.6 3 This is unrealistic and
unnecessarily limiting. 64  Second, there is no indication of an order of
importance among the criteria nor an indication of how judges should weigh
each one against another. Thus, while the criteria appear highly specific,
they will allow the same discretion that they are thought to control.
6 5
Further, although the aggravating factors also mandate and enhance prison
sentences,66 no indication is given as to how these latter functions are to be
carried out.
COMMENTARY ON DETERMINATE SENTENCING BILL 25 '[hereinafter cited as COMMENTARY],
issued by the drafting committee.
62. See note 61 supra. The drafters seem to feel that by eliminating the waiver of
presentence reports by defendants and directing the judge to examine the sentencing
evidence "independently," that they have precluded the disparity resultant from plea
bargains. Obviously, this touches directly only a plea arrangement for sentencing
leniency, and not a bargain for charge reduction. Further, there is no solid reason to
believe that judges won't continue to abide by agreements between counsel when it is
their own docket that the prosecutor is protecting. For a general overview of the
problem, see R. DAWSON, SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO LENGTH, TYPE AND
CONDITIONS (1967); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WrHoUT TRIAL 90-94, 103-30 (1966).
63. The language in the introductory paragraphs uses the word "shall". See notes
54 and 55 supra. There is no indication in the further language of the statutes of an
ejusdem generis classification, which would allow other factors to be considered.
64. Sentencing is too complex a process to suppose we can list all factors that
might enter the judgment to mitigate or aggravate. A recent study of sentencing
practices has indicated that there are over eighty factors involved in determination of
sentence selection and length. LEAA News Release, Feb. 29, 1976, at 1. The
American Bar Association warned against this very mistake of rigidity. "It would be
unwise to attempt the codification of a rigid set of principles which must be employed in
an unbending fashion in each case; such an attempt would suffer from many of the same
defects which accompany mandatory sentences set in advance by the legislature."
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES, supra note 43, at 109.
65. Or they could be used in a totally rote fashion by courts looking for a peg to
hang their decisions on. Since these factors are themselves rather vaguely worded, this
practice of citing to certain factors should prove no problem.
66. See notes 58 and 59 supra.
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Another serious problem of a more general nature is also raised.
Because several of the aggravating criteria depend on the notion of danger-
ousness, 67 the goal conflict between punishment and social defense men-
tioned above re-enters here. The judges are asked to select a sentence
according to the aggravating circumstances of an offense, an objective and
historical exercise. But they will also be asked to make a judgment of the
dangerousness of the offender, that is, make a prediction of future behavior.
Clearly, the Justice Model suggests a system based on equality in terms of
offense and punishment. Dangerousness in such a system is a misplaced
concept which is potentially destructive of this equality since it does not
regard past offenses, but future risk based on personal condition of each
offender.68
Flat Time Prison Terms
The heart of the Justice Model changes lies in the return to determinate
or flat time prison sentences. The proposal is amendatory in nature and
tends to leave the legislative landscape deceptively similar, except for the
major substitution of determinate for indeterminate sentences.
Illinois presently has relatively few mandatory prison sentences. Murder
and four Class 1 felonies are excluded from probation and periodic imprison-
ment.69 Apart from these, the judge may choose any of the sentencing
alternatives except fines, which must be combined with another disposition in
felony sentences.
70
Where the judge chooses imprisonment, there are maximum and mini-
mum terms for each class of felony. 71  Within the very broad ranges
provided for each class, the judge may set a maximum and minimum for
each case, with some limits placed on the use of higher minima. 72 For each
67. Aggravating factors one and two indicate an appeal to prediction, though factor
one (infliction of serious bodily harm) could be taken as a factor increasing the
seriousness of the offense. The language for factor one is borrowed from current Illinois
law. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2 (1975). This section of the Code of
Corrections was the only concession the drafters were willing to make to the concept of
dangerousness. Council Commentary, supra note 36, at 481.
68. This conflict is examined in European codes by Silving, Rule of Law in
Criminal Justice, in G. MUELLER, ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Silving]. See also, C. GERBER & P. McANANY, CONTEMPORARY PUNISHMENT:
VIEWS, EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS 129-74 (1972); Dershowitz, Preventive Con-
finement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277
(1973).
69. See note 34 supra.
70. Id.
71. Murder, 14 to any term; class 1, 4 to any term; class 2, 1-20; class 3, 1-10;
class 4, 1-3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(b), (c) (1975).
72. The statutory minimum for murder is 14 years; for class 1, 4 years; for classes
2-4, 1 year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(c) (1975). Any minimum sentence in
excess of the statutory minimum must be justified by a finding by the court that a higher
minimum is required by the "nature and circumstance of the offense and the history and
character of the defendant." Id. But the minimum for class 2 and 3 felonies may not
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felony class, added to the term of imprisonment selected by the judge, is a
mandatory parole term fixed by law. 73  Thus, an individual has both prison
term and parole term to serve before he is finally discharged. But where he
is released early from prison and successfully completes his parole term, the
total sentence is terminated by discharge from parole. 74  A special rule
applies to all minimum sentences which makes an offender eligible for parole
in twenty years, regardless of his actual minimum sentence.75 There are
good time provisions that diminish both maximum and minimum sen-
tences. 76 Finally, there is a general rule favoring concurrent sentences over
consecutive ones.
77
The Justice Model accepts the general classification of present law,
together with the other rules as set out above. It does, however, eliminate
parole altogether by returning to a determinate, or maximum-sentence-only,
prison term.78 It establishes length for these flat time terms according to
class and provides a small flexibility for mitigating and aggravating circum-
stances. 79  It provides for enhancement of any term on the basis of two of
the four aggravating sentencing criteria.80 It also creates a good time
schedule of 50 percent reduction, or a day off for every day of good
be set closer than one-third of actual maximum sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-
8-1(c)(3), (4) (1975). The statutory one year may not be set higher for class 4 felo-
nies. The reason murder and class 1 felonies are not restricted by the one-third rule
of indeterminacy is that their higher mandatory minimum sentences would force the
maximum upward if the rule were applied to them. Thus, in regard to these two classes
of felonies, courts may exclude parole board consideration by setting minima close to
maxima, e.g., for murder, 14 to 14 and a day.
73. For murder and class 1 felonies, 5 years; for classes 2-3, 3 years; for class 4,
2 years. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(e) (1975).
74. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-8(a) (1975). The parole term itself is subject
by this section to termination early by the parole board when it decides that the parolee
is no longer dangerous. But should the parole be revoked, the parolee faces not only the
remainder of his prison term less the time period during which he was released on parole,
but the remainder of his parole term in prison, thus turning the parole term into a
potential prison sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-9(a)(3)(1) (1975). This
law has been challenged unsuccessfully in Illinois. People v. Wills, 61 Ill. 2d 105, 330
N.E.2d 505 (1975).
75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3(a)(1) (1975).
76. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a) (1975). For the schedule of actual
diminution, see ILLINOIs DEPARTMENT OF CoRREcTIoNs, ADULT DISION,
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS § 813 (1973, as amended). For discussion of the good
time provisions, see notes 168-188 infra and accompanying text.
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-4 (1975). Subparagraph (b) requires the
court to make a finding based on the nature or circumstances of the offense or the
history or character of the defendant for protecting the public for the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
78. For discussion of the elimination of parole, see text accompanying notes 147-
154 infra.
79. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1. For the actual terms, see Table 1
in text accompanying note 82 infra.
80. See notes 55-57 supra.
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behavior.81 Table 1 sets out the present law and proposed changes in
length:
COMPARISON OF PRISON TERMS UNDER PRESENT
ILLINOIS LAW AND UNDER THE JUSTICE MODEL
8 2
Present Law Justice Model
Offense Indeterminate Flat Aggravation Enhanced Good Time
Murder 14 to Life 25 Years ±5 Natural Life 12.5*
Felony 1 4 to Life 8 Years ±2 15 Years (--3)** 4.0(7.5)***
Felony 2 1-20 Years 5 Years ±L2 9 Years (-2) 2.5(4.5)
Felony 3 1-10 Years 3 Years -- 1 5 Years (±-t2) 1.5(2.5)
Felony 4 1-3 Years 2 Years ± 1 5 Years (-2) 1.0(2.5)
*Natural life sentences would earn no good time.
**Aggravation/mitigation factors for enhanced sentences.
***Good time shown here is for average enhanced sentences, without regard to aggra-
vation or mitigation.
Under the proposed legislation the judge is the first and only arbiter of
length of a prison term. What he fixes on the day of sentencing will be,
within parameters of fluctuation based on good time earning and loss, 83 the
time that the offender must serve. This places a new burden on judges.
The rationale for this burden can only be in terms of the equality which the
Justice Model seeks, based on seriousness and proportionality.8 4 The parole
board presently provides backup in the event of judicial sentencing error
through the policy of early release, although their primary function is control
of dangerous offenders.
The Justice Model is based on a return to equal punishment for equal
crimes.8 5 The inconsistency between this philosophy and the use of en-
hanced sentences based on dangerousness is evident.8 6  The man who
burglarizes a home and is a "continuing physical danger" to the community
should be judged no differently in terms of his offense than the ordinary
81. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(a). For discussion of this good
time provision, see text accompanying notes 179-82 infra. While the day-for-day may be
considered a radical departure from present practice, the differences may be negligible.
When one takes into consideration compensatory good time the total amount of good
time earnable evens out after 4 years. After that the present system allows faster
accumulation.
82. Capital murder is not listed here because of its invalidation by the Illinois
Supreme Court. See note 33 supra. The Justice Model includes it in their schema of
penalties. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(b).
83. For discussion, see text accompanying notes 179-82 infra. This element of
indeterminacy may be significant in a system where it alone affects inmate behavior. Up
to 30 days for a single infraction may be taken under the Justice Model provisions.
Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c).
84. The concept of proportionality is a requirement of the Illinois Constitution.
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11. The thrust of the Justice Model is toward fairness to offenders
by dealing with them equally, on the basis of their offenses. FOGEL, supra note 1, at
179-271.
85. The parole process is based on determination of danger or risk to the communi-
ty. MODEL SENTENCING AcT, supra note 18, § 9 and commentary.
86. See, e.g. MoRnis, supra note 5, at 62-77.
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home burglar. A consideration of personal condition is at odds with basic
proportionality by the offense committed.
8 7
The other issue of importance is length of terms. At first blush, taken
together with their good time discount the terms seem terribly short.88 They
are based, according to the drafters, on present actual average time served
by offenders in Illinois.89 The theory was to determine a term whose length
approximates practice rather than attempting to define an ideal. The
problem with this is that it is impossible to assess all the variables that have
to be considered, including all potential convicted felons who were not
sentenced to prison. This seems not to be the case with the present
figures. 90  Whatever the method used in arriving at these suggested lengths,
it seems mandatory that before adoption the projected lengths be compared
accurately with present sentencing outcomes to determine what effect these
lengths will have on prison populations. 9 'Unless Illinois wants to build
more prisons-unthinkable in both fiscal and humane terms-these lengths
should be scrutinized and the legislature effectively warned as to their
impact on an already overcrowded system.
92
Clearly the advantage of flat time sentences in the eyes of prison
inmates is the predictability of outdate. They may even be willing to risk
slightly longer terms for a "day certain" for release. 93 Further, inmates will
surely welcome the abolition of parole supervision so that they can go free in
the community.
9 4
87. Silving, supra note 68. The issue of the clash between proportionality and
danger is only beginning to surface in the courts. See, In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410, 503
P.2d 921, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1973); United States v. Duardi, 384 F. Supp. 874
(W.D. Mo. 1974), appeal dismissed, 514 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1975); but compare, United
States v. Stewart, 18 Crim. L. Rep. 2445 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 1976).
88. For example, a sentence for a class 2 felony under the Justice Model would be
5 years, 25% of the maximum sentence under current law. A sentence for a class 3
felony would be 3 years, 33o of the current maximum sentence; for a class 4 felony,
the Justice Model sentence would be 2 years, 66% of the current maximum. This
gives the misleading impression that the Justice Model is reducing penalties for the more
serious offenses.
89. The explanation of the figures is based on a computation of average actual time
served under present law in Illinois for persons in the Department of Corrections during
1973 and 1974. FOGEL, supra note 1, at 307-11.
90. The drafters have indicated in statements later than the computations of the
analysis cited in note 90 supra, that there will be an increase in time served for class 1
and class 2 felony sentences. COMMENTARY, supra note 61.
91. The John Howard Association has disputed the claim by Dr. Fogel that there
will be no substantial increase in prison population under the projected schema of the
Justice Model. See The John Howard Association, Governor Walker's Proposed Justice
Model: An Analysis Of Its Impact 4 July, 1975 (unpublished publication of the John
Howard Association). They assert that its effect would be to have added approximately
6,400 man years over a three-year period, 1971-73. Id. at 4-5.
92. For discussion of population effects of the Justice Model, see text accompany-
ing notes 155-187 infra.
93. One of the authors has begun to test inmate opinion on just such a proposition.
In a preliminary survey of opinion, approximately two-thirds of the inmates preferred the
flat time sentence.
94. Another finding of this preliminary survey was the strong feeling among
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Appellate Review of Sentences
The Justice Model departs from its amendatory approach to present law
with appellate review of sentences. It adds an entirely new article to the
Code of Corrections which provides a radically altered review process.9 5
Under current Illinois law, sentences are subject to review for illegality,
as well as for excessiveness. 96  This sets Illinois apart from many jurisdic-
tions which do not provide for review of sentences except for strict illegali-
ty.97 While Illinois enjoys this broader scope of review, the practice of
Illinois appellate courts is to respect the trial judge's discretion unless clearly
abusive.9 8 The Code of Corrections has provided appellate courts with
more complete records of sentencing inputs than existed under prior law and
perhaps has induced more careful attention to this duty of review for
excessive sentences. 9 9
The Justice Model article envisions a broad approach to the equaliza-
tion of sentences. Goals are established for the statewide equalization of
sentences according to seriousness of offense, danger to the community, and
rehabilitation of the offender. 10 0 Appellate courts are provided with statis-
tics which will collate all dispositions by type, length, and class of offense.' 0 '
The appeal of a sentence may be part of any regular appeal from the
conviction by the defendant or from sentence only by both the defendant
inmates interviewed that parole supervision was at least as vexing as parole decision-
making. See McAnany, Policy Input for Criminal Justice: The Utilization of Offenders
(a paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Academy of Criminal Justice'
Sciences, Dallas, Texas, March 24-26, 1976).
95. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10. The Article provides for "Appel-
late Review of Sentences" in accord with rules that the Supreme Court may adopt to
cover such new jurisdictional power by adding an amendment to that effect to ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, § 12 (1975).
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, § 615 (1975).
97. For a listing of the jurisdictions, together with statutes, that provide for some
appellate review of sentences, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR
APPELLATE REVIEw OF SENTENCES, Appendix A, (1967) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE
REVIEW OF SENTENCES].
98. SCuLLER, supra note 43, at 263-64. For similar findings in Massachusetts, see
Bart, Criminal Sentence Appeals in Massachusetts, The Appellate Division, Appendix 2
(unpublished paper in Harvard Law School Library).
99. For discussion of the record at sentencing hearings under the Code, see note 45
supra.
100. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 38, § 1005-10-1(a).
Sec. 5-10-1. Purposes.) (a) It is the express policy of the State of Illi-
nois that sentences imposed pursuant to this Code be:
(1) commensurate with the offense committed as aggravated or mitigated
by the nature and circumstances of the particular case;
(2) consistent with the public interest and safety of the community and
most likely to work a full measure of justice between the offender and his
victim(s), if any; and
(3) commensurate with those sentences imposed upon other offenders for
similar offenses committed under similar circumstances.
101. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-8. The Department of Corrections
is mandated to collect and publish these statistics annually.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
and the state.10 2 Appellate courts will be able to open the record for de
novo hearings on mitigation and aggravation' 0 3 and can select and impose
any sentence which they consider fair in the circumstances. 0 4  They may
also take the more traditional route of remanding the case for resentencing
by the trial court.' 0 5
The Justice Model has clearly enhanced the scrutiny of trial court
judges' selection of sentence. This by itself will have an impact on the
exercise of discretion which the judges still enjoy under the Model. Having
provided sentencing criteria, the Model has created automatic guidelines for
review since appellate courts must look to the criteria to test both legality
and fairness. The criticism of the criteria set out above, 10 6 however, will
affect their value to the review process. Overall, with the addition of useful
statistics and the increased ability to inquire de novo at the appellate level,
the Model has great merit in the reduction of disparity.
Several problems which this new appellate process involves need consid-
eration. First, the general problem of goals reappears. It was suggested
above that the sentencing goals of punishment, social defense and rehabilita-
tion tended to be conflicting, a matter which the indeterminate sentencing
system had disregarded. In that system, individual judges and parole board
members were left relatively free to decide for themselves how to reconcile
the conflict. But in the Justice Model, where official discretion is curtailed
and clarification is demanded, the issue of conflict is forced into the open.
In the only clear statement of goals in this new article on appellate review
the authors of the Justice Model demonstrate that they have not understood
the goal conflict.10 7 The statement sets out all major goals' 08 and requires
appellate courts to equalize sentences according to all of them, without
102. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2 (appeals by defendant); § 1005-
10-3 (appeals by State).
103. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-5(b).
104. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-6(a)(3); § 1005-10-6(b)(1)(A).
But the court may not impose another sentence where the State appeals and wins unless
defendant consents. Otherwise it must remand. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-10-6(b) (1) (A).
105. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-6(b)(1)(B).
106. See text accompanying notes 63-66 supra.
107. Though the Justice Model appears to be based on a clarification of the goals
issue, FOGEL note 1 supra, at 180-87, there is no recognition of this in the text of the
bills. By being amendatory and leaving the present goal statement of the Code of
Corrections intact, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001-1-2 (1975), one gains the impression
that the drafters have decided to leave well enough alone-until they come to the
Sentencing Equalization bill where they 4dd a very clear goal statement of their own.
108. See note 100 supra. The subparagraph on rehabilitation seems to have been
added only because the Illinois Constitution appears to require it. ILL. CONST. art. I, §
11. There is a persistent, though latent, theme in the Justice Model against rehabilita-
tion. See amendments deleting statutory language referring to rehabilitation. Proposed
ILL. RE. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-3-2(a) (2); § 1005-6-1(a)(2). For a strong statement of
the case against rehabilitation, see FOGEL, supra note 1, at 122-24.
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recognizing that they are mutually exclusive. Had the Justice Model
pursued its inherent logic of "equality" and punishment, it would have come
out with a limited but satisfactory goal of equal punishment for equal crime.
But in suggesting that courts now explicitly pursue equalization on grounds
not only of punishment, but public protection and rehabilitation as well, it
demands the impossible.
Assuming one could resolve the goals problem, the new article suffers
other deficits. To allow the state to appeal a *sentence on the basis of
leniency is a sharp departure from past Illinois history, as well as general
practice in the country. 10 9 There seems little advantage to balance against
this distortion of power enjoyed by the prosecutor. It will surely have
serious impact on plea bargains when the prosecutor may "have his cake and
eat it too," by bargaining for a sentence and then appealing it.11° Further,
lenient judges will be subject to censure in the sentencing process itself since
the prosecutor will have the sentencing criteria to point to in opposing
inappropriate judicial selection of sentence. Other elements, such as sen-
tencing councils,"' and -the pressure from citizens groups can force trial
judges to "obey the law."
But if the concept of state appeal of lenient sentences is accepted,
certain inequalities favoring the state should be removed from the language
of the article. For instance, the defendant can appeal only from incarcerato-
ry sentences, 1 2 while the state may appeal all sentences. 113  Further, the
state is given a general mandate to appeal all inappropriate sentences," 14
whereas the defendant is limited to types of inappropriate sentences." 5
This balance toward the state is unacceptable and may even violate
constitutional guarantees. 1 6
Finally, the use of statewide statistics on dispositions is problematic.
The goals issue clouds it. Furthermore, is it possible to ascertain the
reasons for sentence selection through even the most sophisticated statistical
analysis?" 7 Perhaps it is, but surely such use of statistics must bear very
109. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 98, Appendix A.
110. While it is true that nonappeal would ordinarily be part of any bargain, the
prosecutor would now have the out under the Justice Model of insisting on appeal be-
cause the judge is interposed as an "independent" third party.
111. It is curious that the Justice Model does not incorporate the use of sentencing
councils among circuit judges. This approach has been backed by the American Bar
Association. See SENTENCING ALTERNATES, supra note 43, at § 7.1. For an analysis of
results of such a practice, see Diamond & Zeisel, Sentencing Councils: A Study in
Sentencing Disparity and its Reduction, 43 'U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1975).
112. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2(b).
113. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-3(c).
114. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-3(a)(1).
115. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-10-2(a)(1) to (4).
116. The Supreme Court has looked suspiciously on treating defendants differently
as a class. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
117. See note 64 supra.
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careful scrutiny lest the appellate courts attempt to level off all sentences
merely by class of offense."'
This raises the problem of how much equality justice can really absorb.
Put bluntly, is it not acceptable to have community standards of judgment
which differ within the state? Can not Peoria determine to assess, within
limits, different degrees of punishment on different types of offenders
because it judges them differently from Chicago or East St. Louis? That
type of question has not been directly raised under present law. Under the
Justice Model it would be raised and perhaps decided to the detriment of
local community appraisal. 119
Parole
Parole Release
The Justice Model bills undertake to abolish the parole release decision
on the assumption that the release decisional process is arbitrary and tends to
create problems within the correctional institutions without offering the
public any benefits. Parole is the status of being released to the community
under supervision prior to the expiration of the sentence.' 20 It must be
differentiated from the decision whether to release on parole. Initially, the
parole release decision will be considered.
Presently, all inmates committed to the Illinois Department of Correc-
tions are eligible for release on parole after they have served the minimum
term of their sentence, or twenty years, whichever is less. 12' The Illinois
Parole and Pardon Board may, in its discretion, undertake to release any
inmate who is eligible for parole and must consider every eligible inmate for
release not less than once each year.' 22  No legislative criteria exist to
indicate when parole should be granted and the Illinois Parole and Pardon
Board has not exercised its authority to establish such criteria by regula-
tion.' 23 Present statutes provide criteria indicating when parole should be
denied. They provide the board with the sole guidelines for determining
whether to release an inmate on parole.'
24
118. There appears no way that present statistical capabilities could reach to the
level of the kinds, weight, and amount of evidence bearing on each factor which entered
into a judge's decision. Even for judges themselves, this is an impossible task.
119. For a discussion of loss of local community prerogatives to a total state
approach to punishment, see Kennedy, Beyond Incrimination: Some Neglected Facets of
the Theory of Punishment, CATALYST (Summer 1970).
120. RUBIN, supra note 3, at 622-23.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-3 (1975).
122. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(f) (1975).
123. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(d) (1975) provides that the parole board
shall promulgate rules for the conduct of its work. Criteria for release certainly would
seem to fall within this provision. However, the board has not promulgated any criteria
as of this writing.
124. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1975) provides:
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The release process is not provided with elaborate procedural safe-
guards. By statute, the parole board is to be supplied with a number of
items of information. 125 This information is not revealed to the inmate prior
to the determination whether to grant parole. In practice, it is not revealed
after the decision is rendered. 126 The inmate does have a right to appear be-
fore one or more members of the board determining whether he should be
released. 127 Such appearances are relatively short in duration.128 By statute
and judicial decision, the inmate is entitled to a statement of the decision of
the board and a written statement setting forth the basis of that decision. 29
Precisely what that decision must consist of is presently a matter of dispute.
There is no administrative review of the decision of the parole board and
judicial review is extremely limited.' 30
Under the Justice Model bills, parole release would be abolished. It
would, of course, be retained for those who committed their crimes prior to
the effective date of the new legislation. As to those individuals there would
be a presumption created in favor of the granting of parole.13 ' For all
(c) The Board shall not parole a person eligible for parole if it determines
that:
(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable
conditions of parole; or
(2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his of-
fense or promote disrespect for the law; or
(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline.
125. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-4(d) (1975). The members of the board are
also given access to all the data in the files of the Department of Corrections.
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-5-1(b) (1975) requires the board to advise every
individual denied parole and his counsel of the factual information relied upon by the
board in determining to deny parole. Arguably, this should afford the inmate who has
been denied parole access to the data considered by the parole board in reaching the
decisions. Upon a request being made for the "factual information relied upon," the
parole board is presently producing the full rationale of the denial of decisions dictated
by board members after the parole hearing. Formerly the parole progress report
prepared by the institutional staff was being released in substantial part as the "factual
information relied upon."
127. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(b) (1975).
128. The length of the Illinois Parole and Pardon Board hearings is not precisely
known. Dawson reports hearings ranging from five to twenty minutes. R. DAWSON,
SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO LENGTH, TYPE & CONDITIONS OF SENTENCE 254
(1969).
129. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(f) (1975).
130. Prior to the decision in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), it was
accepted that the actions of the paroling authority were not reviewable. See Rose v.
Haskins, 388 F.2d 91 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968); Menechino v.
Oswald, 430 F.2d 403 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1033 (1971). This did not
preclude judicial reversal of parole board rules and decisions which were clearly in
violation of the constitution. Smartt v. Avery, 370 F.2d 788 (6th Cir. 1967). Since
Morrissey, a number of courts have determined that the parole release decisions and the
decisional process are reviewable. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff,
525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975); Leonard v. Mississippi State Probation and Parole Bd.,
509 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1975); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Farries v. United States Bd. of Parole, 484 F.2d 948 (7th Cir. 1972).
131. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1975) reads:
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those individuals committed to the Department of Corrections within six
months of the effective date of the Act or sentenced within nine months of
the effective date of the Act, the parole board would be mandated to
establish a release date.132 All terms of parole would expire two years after
(c) The Board shall parole a person eligible for parole unless it determines
that:
(1) there is a substantial risk that he will not conform to reasonable
conditions of parole; or
(2) his release at that time would deprecate the seriousness of his of-
fense or promote disrespect for the law; or
(3) his release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline.
The sentence attaches at the time of commission of the crime and the application of new
sentencing law to one committing a crime before the effective date of the new law would
violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. People ex rel. Carlstrom v. David,
336 111. 353, 168 N.E.2d 264 (1929).
132. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2A reads:
Sec. 5-8-2A. Duties of Parole and Pardon Board.)
(a) The Parole and Pardon Board, after notice and hearing, shall review
the sentences imposed on all institutionalized offenders with the Illinois Peni-
tentiary System sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment within
9 months of the effective date of this 1975 amendatory Act or within 6
months after an offender is committed to the Bureau of Prisons, whichever
is later.
(b) Based on the information set forth in Section 3-3-4 of this Code, the
intent of the Court in imposing the offender's sentence, the present schedule
of sentence for similar offenses provided by Sections 5-8-1 and 5-4-2 of this
Code, the rate of accumulating good time credits provided by Section 3-6-
3 of this Code, and the behavior of the offender since his commitment to
the Department, the Board shall set a tentative release date for each offender.
The Board shall render its decision within a reasonable time after hear-
ing and shall state the basis therefor both in the records of the Board and
in written notice to the person on whose case it has acted. In its decision,
the Board shall set the person's time for release, subject to the restrictions
set forth in this Section.
(c) The tentative release date set by the Board shall take into account the
possibility that the offender can accumulate good time credits at the rate
specified in Section 3-6-3 of this Code, and shall be contingent thereon.
(d) The notice and hearing procedures of the Board shall meet the following
standards.
(1) Each offender shall be given at least 30 days notice of the date
and purpose of said hearing, in a form substantially as follows:
(date of notice)
Dear (name of offender):
Pursuant to Public Act -, the Parole and Pardon Board will meet
on (date of hearing) to fix a definite date for your release from prison.
The date set supposes that you will continue to accumulate good time
credits at the maximum rate so if you do not do that, you will have
to stay in prison for a longer time than indicated. The Board will base
its determination on the following data:
(1) The material the Board normally would examine in connection with
your parole hearing, as set forth in paragraph (d) of Section 3-3-4 of
the Unified Code of Corrections;
(2) the intent of the court in imposing sentence on you;
(3) the present schedule of sentences for similar offenses provided by
Sections 5-8-1 and 5-8-2 of the Unified Code of Corrections, as amended;
(4) the rate of accumulating good time credits provided by Section 3-
6-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections, as amended;
(5) your behavior since commitment. This hearing is not a parole hear-
ing. Instead it is designed to fix a definite release date, beyond which
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the effective date of the Act. 1 33  The board would retain its discretion in
determining conditions of parole, except that there would be a mandatory
prohibition against the possession of firearms by the parolees.
184
The Illinois Parole and Pardon Board would continue under the Justice
Model legislation to administer the supervision of parole for those sentenced
under prior law.13 5 It would continue to determine when an individual
should be released from the Department of Corrections, although this would
be a mere ministerial act.'3 6 Presently, the parole board serves as the
screening body for pardon and clemency petitions to the governor, a function
which would be retained. The clemency function would gain in importance
since it would be the only administrative device available to reduce a long
you will not be held by the Department. In effect, your present inde-
terminate sentence will be changed into a flat-time sentence by this pro-
cedure. You will remain eligible for parole on the same terms as were
in effect at the time you were sentenced, but now you will also know
that if you accumulate good time at the maximum rate, you will be
released no later than the date determined as a result of this hearing.
You may submit material to the board which you believe helpful in decid-
ing the proper date for your release. The Department is obligated to
assist you in that effort, if you ask it to do so. When the Board has
made its decision you will be informed of it and of the reasons there-
for.
(2) At least one member of the Board shall interview each offender
prior to the date of hearing, and a report of that interview shall be
made available to the Board for its consideration.
(e) The release date established by the Board shall not be sooner than the
earliest date that the offender would have been eligible for release under the
sentence imposed on him by the court, less time credit for good behavior, nor
shall it be later than the latest date at which the offender would have been
eligible for release under such sentence, less time credit for good behavior.
(f) Should any offender be eligible for parole or release on a date earlier than
that established pursuant to this Section the Board shall schedule a parole hear-
ing for such offender as presently provided by law. Based on that hearing,
the Board may either parole or release the offender or deny parole and release
and set a date for rehearing, as presently provided by law. The date of re-
hearing shall be no later than the release date established pursuant to this
Section.
(g) No defendant paroled by the Board more than 2 years after the effective
date of this amendatory Act of 1975 shall be subject to a parole term. The
parole terms of all other defendants shall expire 2 years after the effective date
of this amendatory Act of 1975 or at the time prescribed by the Board or by
the law under which they were sentenced, whichever is soonest
133. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-2A(g).
134. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-7(a) reads:
Section 3-3-7. Conditions of Parole.)
(a) The conditions of parole shall be such as the Parole and Pardon Board
deems necessary to assist the parolee in leading a law-abiding life. The con-
ditions of every parole are that the parolee:
(1) not violate any criminal statute of any jurisdiction during the parole term;
and
(2) refrain from possessing a firearm or other dangrous weapon except where
the person was convicted of a Class 4 felony or lesser offense and such
possession is required as a condition of employment.
135. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-7(a) is substantially the same as the
present section. The proposal includes a limitation of the applicability of that section to
individuals serving a term of imprisonment under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1
(1975) as it presently exists.
136. The proposal leaves ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-2(b) (1975) unchanged.
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sentence whether as a result of public sentiment, particularly good institu-
tional conduct or a need to reduce the institutional population.
If one assumes the reduction of crime to be a principal goal for the
parole system, one cannot evaluate the effectiveness of the parole system,
since data which exists as to performance is contradictory.' 37 The decision
whether to release an individual on parole encompasses a determination by
the paroling authority that the individual has been "rehabilitated," that is, he
is no longer a danger to society.' 3 8  This process assumes that it is possible
to determine when an individual is "rehabilitated" and no longer dangerous.
There is a serious question whether such a determination is possible with any
degree of accuracy.' 3 9 The composition of the paroling authority generally is
not one that would tend to bring the expertise of behaviorial science to
bear. 140 Finally, there is a serious question whether society can or should
accept the making of such a decision unless it can be made with more
accuracy.' 4 '
Institutional unrest is not infrequently attributed to the parole release
137. Von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement of
Convicted Persons, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 717 (1972); Wenk, Robinson & Smith, Can
Violence be Predicted? 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 393 (1972).
138. This is the basis of the decision as understood by most inmates and by a
number of critics. See Kastenmeier & Eglit, Parole Release Decision Making:
Rehabilitation, Expertise and the Demise of Mythology, 22 AM. U.L. REv. 477, 503-06
(1973); MoRims, supra note 5, at 31. For a discussion of the history and theory of
parole granting, see notes 9-19 supra and accompanying text. There is considerable
room to question whether the legislatures or the parole boards themselves view their role
as being one of controlling dangerousness or promoting rehabilitation. The legislative
criteria for denial of parole established by ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-5(c) (1975)
are not solely based on a lack of rehabilitation or present dangerousness. To deny parole
because release would deprecate the seriousness of the offense or promote disrespect for
the law seems to be a consideration of deterrence and retribution rather than rehabilita-
tion. The regulations adopted by the United States Board of Parole likewise place great
weight on the offense indicating a retributional or deterrent basis. 28 C.F.R. § 2.18
and § 2.20 (1975).
139. Some works suggest that it is possible to predict dangerousness with some
degree of success, KOZOL, supra note 24. The John Howard Association in its published
criticism of the Justice Model bills cites statistics from the NCCD Research Center,
Unified Parole Reports, "Newsletter 'Number on Parole'-1974" indicating a low rate of
recidivism while on parole. One study indicates that the rate of recidivism for those
released by a parole release decision was not significantly lower than that of those
released by force of statute under mandatory supervision at the end of their sentences.
CrrTZENs' INQUIRY ON PAROLE AND CRIMINAL JusncE REPORT ON NEW YORK PAROLE 268
(1974).
140. Under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-1(b) (1975) the parole board is to be
composed of individuals with at least 5 years of actual experience in the fields of
penology, corrections work, law enforcement, sociology, law, education, social work,
medicine, psychology, or other behavioral sciences. There is nothing inherent in the
practice of these fields that would insure that the individual can predict recidivism, if
that is what they are supposed to do. It would seem that the "expertise" of this group
would be subject to the same types of criticism which Frankel levels at the sentencing
"expertise" of judges, FRANmKEL, supra note 30, at 13-14.
141. Norval Morris has argued the moral questions well. Mosums, supra note 5, at
80-84.
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decision. However, while the parole release decision is the subject of inmate
complaints, this should not be taken as an indication that it is the principal
cause of inmate unrest.142  It may well be that inmates fasten on the parole
release decision as a symbol of the arbitrariness of the entire correctional
system and the removal of this symbol would only minimally reduce inmate
frustration.
1 43
Until recently the paroling authorities had not developed a statement of
the criteria which they utilize in reaching their decision. Parole boards have
admitted, and studies have confirmed, that members reach decisions to grant
or deny parole for entirely different reasons. 4 4 Recent judicial decisions
have injected procedural due process into the parole release decision. These
decisions are too recent to determine what will ultimately be determined to
be required by procedural due process. Presently, it would appear that the
decisions will require the paroling authority to reveal the data upon which it
is going to make its decision prior to the parole hearing with an opportunity
for the inmate to amplify, clarify or correct the contents thereof, require the
adoption of written published criteria for determining whether to grant
parole and require the paroling authority to provide a written statement of
the reasons for parole denial. 45
Parole Supervision
Together with the abolition of the parole release decision, the Justice
Model bills would abolish parole itself. Parole is supervision in the commu-
142. FOGEL, supra note 1, at 301-03; O.LAND, supra note 5, at 129, 134-36; R.
MINTON, INSIDE PRISON AMERICAN STYLE 157-93 (1971). See also ATrICA REPORT,
supra note 26, at 97.
143. This distinction is similar to that noted by Vernon Fox with regard to prison
riots. He suggests that the precipitating cause of the riot may not be the actual cause or
predisposing cause. So too, the parole granting system may be the symbol of the
frustration rather than the cause of the frustration. See Fox, Why Prisoners Riot, 35
FED. PROBATION 9, 10 (1971).
144. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 128-29 (1967). An
interesting study of an unnamed parole board (in fact the Illinois Parole and Pardon
Board) indicated that its decisions failed to comport with any conceivable model for de-
cision making. Frank J. Austin, The Parole & Pardon Board: Decision Making in the
Criminal Justice System (1974) (Unpublished Masters Thesis Presented to the Graduate
School Department of Sociology, DePaul University).
145. United States ex rel. Richerson v. Wolff, 525 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1975) (must
give written reasons for denial of parole); United States ex rel. Johnson v. Chairman,
500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 1974), vacated as moot, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974) (must give written
reasons for parole denial); Childs v. United States Bd. of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (must give written reasons for denial of parole); Haymes v. Regan, 394 F.
Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (must develop criteria for parole granting); Franklin v.
Shields, 399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975) (must give access to data upon which
decision based, a written decision for parole denial and promulgate criteria for determin-
ing whether to grant parole); Cooley v. Seigler, 381 F. Supp. 444 (D. Minn. 1974)
(must give access to data upon which parole decision based); In re Prewitt, 8 Cal. 3d
470, 503 P.2d 1326, 105 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1973) (must give access to data upon which
decision based); Monks v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 277 A.2d 193 (Sup. Ct. N.J.
1971).
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nity under rules and regulations established by the paroling authority and the
legislature 146 after a period of incarceration.
Presently, there is a strong commitment to community supervision
programs in the Illinois system. Prisoners have mandatory terms of parole
established by the legislature which require that the individual spend some
period of time under supervision after his release from prison before the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections is terminated. 147  If the
individual is released on parole prior to the termination of the sentence
imposed, the mandatory parole term established by statute constitutes the
maximum term which he may spend on parole. If the individual is not
released before the expiration of his prison sentence, then upon such release
Pie will still be required to serve a term of parole not exceeding that
established by statute. Violation of the terms and conditions of parole can
result in the individual being returned to the institution to serve a portion of
his remaining sentence and possibly the loss of good time earned while in the
institution. 1
48
Commentary prepared for the Justice Model spends considerable time
dealing with the reasons for the abolition of the parole release decision, but
does not seriously discuss the abolition of parole. 149 The abolition of parole
is somewhat inconsistent since the proposals retain probation and vest
supervision thereof in the Department of Corrections.'
50
Parole does provide protection to the community through providing
supervision of the individual's activities during the immediate post-release
period. In addition, it provides the inmate with a source of services,
counseling and assistance which he is, to some extent, coerced into utilizing
by the power of the parole officer to initiate the parole revocation process.
Illinois Prison Population
Large penal institutions tend to become warehouses for human beings
rather than places for the provision of rehabilitational services. The larger
the institution, the more emphasis there is on custody and security and the
less there is on programs which fit the needs of the individual. 15' The
146. For a statutory statement of the present conditions for parole see ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-7 (1975).
147. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(e) (1975).
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-3-9 (1975) provides the authority to revoke
parole and return the individual to the institution. Section 813, (III) Illinois Dept. of
Corrections Regs., provides for the revocation of good time "on recommendation" of the
parole board.
149. David Fogel, in his testimony before House Judiciary II sub-committee of the
Illinois General Assembly, September 11, 1975, devotes two paragraphs to the abolition
of parole itself. He suggests that it is impossible for the parole agent to both counsel
and be a police officer. This seems to fly in the face of retaining probation with a
similar dual function.
150. See proposed ILL. REV. STAT. cl. 38, § 1005-6-1.
151. See W. NAGEL, THE NEW RED BARN: A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE MODERN
AMERICAN PRisON 55-57 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NEW RED BARN).
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desirability of smaller institutions seems well accepted by the correctional
community, but the costs of replacing the large institution, like those in
Illinois, are excessive and replacement may not be politically feasible.152
The Justice Model bills are premised upon the assumption that more
rational sentences with fewer variances for identical crimes, together with the
removal of the uncertainty of parole release will make prisons more "just"
and thus much easier places to operate for those incarcerated therein. 15
The changes proposed by the Justice Model de-emphasize "rehabilitation."
There is a preference for some period of incarceration for most sentences.
It is appropriate to consider the effect of the proposed changes on institutional
population in light of the goals of the Justice Model and the known effect
of increasing institutional population.
After several years of steadily decreasing prison population the Illinois
prison population dramatically increased during 1975.154 This increase does
not correspond with any particularly sharp increase in crime; rather it
appears to reflect an increased disposition towards imprisonment on the part
of the courts. 155
The prison administration has little control over the size of the prison
population.156 Rather, the courts, the legislature and the parole board
functioning independently, but in concert, establish the size of the institution-
al population.
15 7
The legislature effectively assures the existence of a prison population
of a predictable size through the establishment of mandatory prison sen-
tences and the limitation of the dispositional alternatives available to the
courts. The prison population is further controlled by the legislature's
prescribing the criteria for parole release.158 Legislative control of institu-
tional population is not limited to the situations where the statute directly
152. There are 4,208 people employed in the eight existing facilities in Illinois. U.S.
LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION AND U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 1970-1971
297 (1973). Since these institutions tend to have rural settings, they frequently are the
largest local employer and thus have all the problems in closing such an institution that
the United States Government has in closing a military base.
153. See generally FOGEL, supra note 1, at 199-265.
154. Flanagan, Imminent Crisis in Prison Population, 37 AM. J. OF COR.ECTIONS 20
(1975). At this writing the statistics indicating the rate of incarceration are not
available.
155. Id.
156. This is not to suggest that administration does not have some control. In
addition there are the informal controls arising from informal relationships with the
parole board.
157. Presently the court has available the alternatives of probation, or conditional
release which are totally non-incarcerational. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d)
(1975).
158. It is not our suggestion that the legislature consciously establish a prison
population of given size. However, provisions such as ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-
3(d)(1) & (g) (1975) severely limit dispositional alternatives for class one felonies.
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limits judicial discretion to choose non-incarcerational alternatives. Appro-
priations also control disposition since for the courts to employ alternatives to
incarceration, the resources to operate such alternatives must exist.
Presently the ability of the accused to bargain for a sentence permits the
judiciary, with the cooperation of the prosecution, to employ non-incarcera-
tional alternatives.' 59 The courts themselves have control over the alterna-
tive forms of disposition chosen in a large number of offenses as well as the
power to set the maximum and minimum sentences within the parameters
established by the legislature. 160 The courts are presently only employing
the probationary alternative in 35 to 40 percent of all felonies despite an
arguable preference for the utilization of this alternative. 16' 'Part of this is
due to the lack of community correctional resources, part to community
pressure for incarceration. 1' 62 This is particularly true where the cases
involved have received considerable public attention. The judge who is
elected can safely sentence the individual to prison and place the release
decision, and thus community wrath, on the parole board.' 63
The parole board, through its choice of criteria to be employed in
determining whether to release on parole together with the relative weight to
be given to these criteria, can affect prison population. 64 The board rarely
paroles individuals whose offenses have attracted public attention until some
years after they have become eligible for parole. The greater the weight
given to the crime committed in determining whether to grant parole, the
greater the likelihood of parole denial, thus increasing prison population. 6 5
159. Charges which could prelude incarceration may be bargained to lesser charges
which permit a non-incarcerated alternative. Additionally a recommended disposition
may be the subject of bargain. See NEWMAN, supra note 62, at 112-30 (1966).
160. The Illinois legislature has exercised this power in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
1005-8-1 (1975) which established maximum and minimum sentences and mandatory
parole.
161. See 1973 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS
CouRTs 136-37 (1974).
162. Parole authorities can and have increased the rate of release from institutions
during periods of stress. NATIONAL ADvISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COIRRECTIONS 395 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CORRECTIONS].
See also Costello v. Wainwright, 525 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1976).
163. One of Mr. Merritt's clients has remained incarcerated for thirty years because
of an unpleasant series of incidents. He is eligible for parole and his case is reviewed
annually by the parole board. At the time of each review a Chicago newspaper publi-
cizes the fact, giving a synopsis of the facts of the case.
A similar situation existed in Ohio. In 1968-69 the Ohio Adult Parole authority
considered a grant of parole for Thomas Licavoli, a convicted gangland murderer of the
1930's era. At that time, television stations in Toledo, Ohio broadcast numerous
editorials opposing parole even though Licavoli was then in his late sixties and planned
to settle in Columbus, Ohio. Eventually, parole was granted.
164. See note 123 supra.
165. Without some publicly announced criteria for the determination whether to
grant parole, it is impossible to determine what weight the parole board is giving to the
offense in denying parole. See note 144 supra.
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The prison administration's only method of control of institutional
population is through varying the rate of earning good time or the amount of
good time which is taken through institutional discipline. 16 6 This will tend to
control the population although its effect is not immediate. Additionally, the
prison administration can employ alternative placements to the institutions
such as work release to redistribute the population and thus permit the
addition of population without the adverse impact of overcrowding.'
67
The proposed Justice Model bills have a number of features which will
tend to affect the institutional population. A number of changes will tend to
decrease the institutional population. Any ambiguity concerning the prefer-
ence for placing all felons on probation is removed and the preference for
probation made clear.' 68  Additionally, the proposed centralization of
control over probation will presumably provide better community resources,
thus making probation a more acceptable alternative. 6 9 The fact that flat
166. ILL. REV. Stat. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3 (1975) requires the establishment of a good
time system but does not specify rates of good time. Regulation 811 of the Illinois
Department of Corrections establishes a sliding scale for earning good time.
167. Illinois Department of Corrections Regs. § 1200 provides for placement in
work release centers. This regulation was substantially narrowed after a series of
articles in the Chicago Daily News and has twice been revised since October, 1975.
168. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-6-1 reads:
Sec. 5-6-1. Sentences of Mandatory Supervision and of Conditional Dis-
charge.) a) Except where specifically prohibited by other provisions of this
Code, the court shall impose a sentence of mandatory supervision or condi-
tional discharge upon an offender unless, having regard to the nature and
circumstance of the offense, and to the history, character and conditions of
the offender, the court is of the opinion that:
(1) his imprisonment or periodic confinement is necessary for the pro-
tection of the public; or
(2) mandatory supervision or conditional discharge would deprecate the
seriousness of the offender's conduct and would be inconsistent with the ends
of justice.
(b) The court may impose a sentence of conditional discharge for an
offense if the court is of the opinion that neither a sentence of imprisonment
nor of mandatory supervision is appropriate.
169. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1006-5-1 (a)-(c) reads:
Sec. 6-5-1. Establishment.) The Bureau shall make provisions for adult
mandatory supervision services in each circuit. Bureau shall have the respon-
sibility:
(a) To preserve complete and accurate records of the action of the court
with respect to the case of each person and his supervisor the subsequent
history of such person, and if he becomes a recidivist during the continuance
of his supervision. These records shall be open to inspection by any judge
or by any field services officer pursuant to order of court, but shall not be
a public record, and its contents shall not be divulged otherwise than as above
provided, except upon order of court;
(b) To supervise and provide services to all persons placed on manda-
tory supervision under such regulations and for such terms as may be pre-
scribed by the court, and giving to each person full instructions as to the
terms of his release upon supervision and requiring from him such periodic
reports as shall keep the Bureau of Offender Control employee informed as
to his conduct;
(c) To supervise and provide services to persons diverted from the adjudi-
cation process by deferred prosecution or other means, as directed by the
court regarding the individual and as may be agreed to or contracted for,
with the Bureau.
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time sentencing has historically meant shorter sentences should not be
overlooked. 170  Furthermore, the provision of specific statutory criteria for
mitigation of sentence will tend to force the courts to shorten sentences in
specific instances.171  Periodic imprisonment will become available for all
felonies, particularly armed robbery. 17 2 Thus, this alternative will be
available in specific cases.
Presently, those incarcerated in local facilities on misdemeanor sen-
tences for a period in excess of two months may be transferred to the custody
of the Illinois Department of Corrections.17 3  The proposed changes would
raise the length of sentence necessary for transfer to a state institution to nine
months, thus freeing the institutional space theretofore occupied by the
misdemeanants for felons.' 74 Finally, prison incarceration is almost abol-
ished for Class Four felonies.' 75
Other features of the Justice Model bills would tend to increase
population. Despite the express preference for probation as a disposition for
all offenses, there is a prohibition against employing it as the sole disposition
for Class One and Two felonies, a disposition presently permitted. 76 The
court has the alternative of combining it with periodic imprisonment or a
fine. Most defendants are unable to afford the financial burden of a fine,
leaving the court with the alternatives of imprisonment or probation with
170. See RuBIN, supra note 3, at 162-66.
171. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.1. See notes 54 and 55 supra for
text of sections.
172. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3(d) reads:
(d) When a defendant is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, the
court may sentence such defendant to:
(1) a period of mandatory supervision or conditional discharge except
in cases of murder, rape, armed violence that is punishable as a Class 1
felony, armed robbery, violation of Sections 401(a), 402(a), 405(a) or 407
of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act that is punishable as a felony or
violation of section 9 of the Cannabis Control Act that is punishable as
a Class I felony;
(2) a term of periodic imprisonment;
(3) a term of imprisonment;
(4) a fine. However, neither a period of mandatory supervision or condi-
tional discharge nor a fine shall be the sole disposition in such felony cases
but shall be imposed in such cases only together with or in addition to
another disposition under paragraph (d) of this Section.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-6(b) (1975).
174. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-6(b).
175. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005--1(b)(5) reads:
(b) Except as provided in paragraphs (a) (2) and (a) (3) of this Code,
a defendant convicted of a felony offense and sentenced to a term of impri-
sonment shall have that term set as follows:
(5) for a Class 4 felony, the term shall be 2 years with up to 1 year
added or subtracted for aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Such sentence
shall be served under the supervision of the Bureau of Community Safety
or local correctional officials, unless the Class 4 felony is to be served con-
secutively or concurrently with any other felony. Offenders subject to para-
graphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of Section 5-5-3.2 of this Code shall be sentenced
as provided in Section 5-8-2.
176. For a discussion of this preference, see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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periodic imprisonment in local jail, local jails frequently being worse physi-
cally and operationally than the state prisons.
1 77
The establishment of criteria for the aggravation of sentences will have
the effect of increasing population.' 7 8 The severe limitations placed on the
judicial choice of sentence length indicates that the relative length of the
sentences ultimately prescribed will be of particular importance in determin-
ing population. If the length of the sentences established by the legislature
less good time is longer than the present average time served for all inmates
convicted of a particular class of offense, the net result is longer prison terms
with increased population. 1
79
The loss of parole release deprives the correction system of a popula-
tion-reducing device.' 80 The provisions for sentence review are essentially
neutral as to the prison population. However, permitting the state to appeal a
sentence must have the consequences of raising the institutional population
to some degree.
It cannot be predicted precisely what will occur to the institutional
populations should the proposals be adopted as presently drafted. It can
safely be said that the changes regarding the transfers of a misdemeanant to
the custody of the Department of Corrections together with the placement of
most Class Four felons in jail and the use of periodic imprisonment will
increase the local jail population dramatically.' 8 ' Increased prison popula-
tion is undesirable. Increased jail population is even more undesirable.' 8 2
177. See Mattick & Aikman, The Cloacal Regions of American Corrections, 381
TYIE ANNALS OF THE AM. ACADEMY OF POL. & SOCIAL SCI. 109 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as CLOACAL REGIONS]; R. GOLDFARB, JAILS: THE ULTIMATE GHETrO 50-54 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as GOLDFARB].
178. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3.2. The proposed sentence length
approximates the actual time presently served on the particular classes of felonies in
Illinois. Assuming that length or some other length approximating current time served
is chosen, then the enhancement of the sentence necessarily raises the sentence above the
present average thus causing more man-days to be spent in prison and therefore a larger
prison population.
179. The present proposal lengths are set forth. See Table 1. It is to be expected
that there would be some pressure to keep the same sentence length as present
maximums and abolish parole release. This appears to have occurred in Maine.
M.R.S.A., tit. 17-A, § 1252 (West 1976 Supp.)
180. The use of parole as a device to lessen prison population during periods of
tension is not unknown. See CORRECTIONS, supra note 168, at 395; Increase in Parole
Alarms Law Officials in California, N.Y. Times, December 14, 1975, at 1, cols. 4 & 5.
181. While the Illinois jails are technically not overcrowded, see LEAA: NATION-
AL JAIL CENSUS 1970 16 (1971), with only 3.7% of the jails being over the rated
population, the facilities of many are antiquated. See generally H. MATrICK & R.
SWEET, ILLINOIS JAILS (1967).
182. See H. Mattick, The Contemporary Jails of the United States: An Unknown
and Neglected Area of Justice in D. GIAsEp, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGY 777 (1974).
For a discussion of the problems in specific jails see Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom., 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972); Taylor v. Sterrett,
344 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Tex. 1972), modified, 499 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 983, rehearing denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975); Hamilton v. Love, 328
F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Rhem v. Malcolm, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Prison Administration
Good Time and Discipline
The Justice Model bills as proposed will directly and indirectly work
changes in the institutional disciplinary system and the good time system. It
is thus appropriate to undertake a brief analysis to determine whether these
changes will achieve the rationality of correctional operations and the
equality of treatment which the Model envisions.
The institutional administration reduces the total length of the sentence
based on the inmate's good behavior or good conduct while in the institution.
This reduction, mandated by statute and established by regulation, is time
off for good behavior or "good time.' 8 3 In addition to awarding good time
for institutional behavior, the Illinois Department of Corrections also awards
good time credits as a form of remuneration for work performed in prison
industries and programs.' 8 4  Good time which has been awarded for good
institutional behavior may be taken from the inmate as a form of discipline
for infractions of the institutional rules. An inmate may also lose the right
to earn good time in the future as discipline.'8 5 However, by regulation,
good time given in remuneration for work performed in the prison industries
may not be taken as a form of discipline.186
The structure and form of the institutional disciplinary proceeding have
largely been established by the judiciary. The Supreme Court established
the tenor of the judicial approach in Wolff v. McDonnell,1 7 although the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and several other
courts had theretofore enunciated most of the same procedural require-
ments.' 8 8  Under these decisions, the inmate facing serious disciplinary
action, which would include the loss of good time, must be afforded: 1)
Written notice of the charges against him not less than twenty-four hours
prior to the proceeding at which his guilt is to be determined; 2) an
opportunity to appear at that hearing; 3) an opportunity to present his
version of the occurrence or to deny that he committed the act; 4) the
opportunity to call witnesses on his behalf; 5) the opportunity to present
documentary evidence on his behalf; 6) a hearing body composed of
individuals not involved in the incident; and 7) a written decision stating the
factual basis thereof which must be made on substantial evidence.' 89
183. Proposed ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3.
184. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-12-5 (1975). See also note 209 infra.
185. The authority for taking of good time is the same as that earning for good
time. See note 184 supra.
186. Illinois Department of Corrections Reg. § 866 II B by implication.
187. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
188. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
189. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974) required everything except a written decision. Wolff v.
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The drafters of the Uniform Code of Corrections did an excellent job of
precursing the judicial decisions and the Code provides by statute most of the
procedural guarantees which the courts have found due process to require in
prison discipline. 190 In addition, the Code permits the inmate to examine
all witnesses called to testify before the disciplinary body and requires that
disciplinary proceedings be commenced within seventy-two hours of the
occurrence.191
There is no appeal from the decision of the disciplinary committee, but
review can be had by filing an institutional grievance. The grievance
procedure provides a three-stage review of the complaint within the Depart-
ment of Corrections, the first two stages being within the particular
institution and the third stage at the departmental level. 19 2 On paper, the
disciplinary and grievance systems appear to provide the inmate with
considerable protection as to assure a fair and rational result. As will be
further discussed, considerable problems arise in the implementation of these
safeguards.19
The Justice Model would establish a flat rate for the earning of good
time at one day of good time for each day served.19 4  Compensatory good
time, that is, good -time in return for work performed within the institution,
would be abolished. 9 5 Good time which had been earned would be vested
at least monthly under rules and regulations to be established by the
Department of Corrections.'9 " Unvested good time and the right to earn
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) added the requirement of a written decision. The
Seventh Circuit in Aikens v. Lash, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed,
44 U.S.L.W. 3122 (U.S. July 5, 1975) added a requirement that the decision be
based on substantial evidence.
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7 (1975) provides for an impartial hearing
body, written notice of the charges, a hearing, the ability to summon witnesses and a
written decision.
191. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7(c) and (e)(3) (1975). Wolff expressly
eschewed cross-examination. 418 U.S. at 567. The Ninth Circuit found it a necessary
part of due process. Cluchette v. Procunier, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. granted
sub nom., Enomoto v. Cluchette, 421 U.S. 1010 (1975).
192. The establishment of the grievance system is mandated by statute. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-8 (1975). The actual structure is established by regulations. Ill.
Dept. of Corrections Reg. § 845.
193. See notes 199-203 infra and accompanying text.
194. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3 (a) reads:
Sec. 3-6-3. Rules and Regulations for Diminution of Sentence.) (a) The
Department of Corrections shall prescribe rules and regulations for the diminu-
tion of sentences on account of good conduct or meritorious service of persons
committed to the Department. Such rules and regulations shall provide for
the accumulation of such good time credits at a base rate of one day for
each day of imprisonment or supervision subject to the provisions of paragraph
(c) of this Section.
195. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-12-5 deletes those provisions permit-
ting the award of good time credits in lieu of wages.
196. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-6-3(c) reads:
(c) The Department shall prescribe rules and regulations for revoking
good time, or suspending or reducing the rate of accumulation thereof, during
imprisonment or supervision. Such rules and regulations shall provide for
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good time in the future could be affected by disciplinary action. Restrictions
on the earning of good time could not be of more than thirty days' duration
for a single infraction.
1 97
The disciplinary procedure would remain unchanged by the Justice
Model bills. However, the Department of Corrections would be required to
establish a listing of infractions of institutional rules together with the
penalties to be attached thereto to provide the inmates with fair notice of the
possible results of their actions.198
While the Justice Model is touted as returning Illinois to determinate
sentencing, the retention of good time, particularly at a day-for-day rate,
results in the sentencing system remaining indeterminate. 199 Unlike the
present sentence structure, the resulting one would have only good time
contributing to indeterminacy. Good time in turn would be dependent
solely upon institutional behavior. Thus, the determination of the actual
release date would depend solely upon the disciplinary committee. This
seems to conflict with the concern of the Justice Model for equality.
While the hearing procedures of the Department of Corrections are sub-
ject to considerable procedural safeguards, and would appear to be a fairer
and more rational proceeding than a parole release determination, it is sug-
gested that this is not the case. The disciplinary system must fail because
those designated to conduct the hearings are members of the institutional
staff. These individuals have regular duties within the institution other than
hearing disciplinary matters or have been temporarily released from these
duties and will be returned to such duties in a matter of days or weeks. As
a result, the committee is likely to be reluctant to find an inmate not guilty of
an infraction charged by a guard. To do so would be a failure to support a
fellow upon whose actions other staff members' safety and lives might
depend in the immediate future.
20 0
the vesting of good time credits previously earned on a not less than monthly
basis: and, shall provide further for the suspension of the right to accumulate
good time, or, for a reduction in the rate of such accumulation, for fixed
periods subsequent to a particular infraction not to exceed 30 days.
197. Id.
198. Proposed ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-8-7(a) reads:
Sec. 3-8-7. Disciplinary Procedures.) (a) All disciplinary action shall
be consistent with this Chapter. Committed persons shall be informed of
rules of behavior and conduct, the penalties for violation thereof, and the
disciplinary procedure by which such penalties may be imposed. Such rules,
penalties and procedures shall be posted and available to the persons com-
mitted.
199. In its most basic form an indeterminate sentence is one in which the actual day
of release is not capable of being calculated at the time that the sentence is imposed.
However, the normal use of the term indeterminate refers to a sentence where there is a
large period during which the individual could be paroled. See RUBIN, supra note 3, at
157-59.
200. Prison operations have not been the subject of sufficient empirical research to
provide statistics which suggest this. What studies exist tend to indicate that the prison
disciplinary hearing is viewed by the staff as a dispositional hearing rather than a guilt
determining proceeding. Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in
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Under current practice, the committee in hearing disciplinary committee
violations rarely hears the testimony of the officer making the allegations
against the inmate. Corroborating witnesses are called with even less fre-
quency. The calling of inmate witnesses is the exception rather than the rule.
These actions are justified on the basis that the guards' testimony is not neces-
sary and that inmates called as witnesses would not be reliable because they
desire to protect each other and fear reprisals should they testify against an-
other inmate. This argument ignores the fact that much the same can be
said for the accusing guard staff of the disciplinary committee itself.
20'
The written decisions of the disciplinary committee are frequently
nothing more than a recitation of the charges or more frequently a statement
that the committee accepts the facts as stated in the violation report. Since
no record exists of the disciplinary hearing, it is impossible to determine what
evidence, if any, the disciplinary committee had before it or the basis upon
which it reached its decisions.
202
The administrative grievance procedure is designed to correct errors in
disciplinary proceedings through a de novo hearing. 20 3 The existing griev-
ance system appears to be reasonably effective in providing some relief from
erroneous disciplinary proceedings. However, the relief appears to be
granted at the departmental level rather than the institutional level thus
demonstrating the inability of the institutional staff to find that their fellow
employees erred.
20 4
If the purpose of the proposed changes is to eliminate frustration arising
from the uncertainty of the release date and the apparent arbitrariness of the
parole board, it does not appear that the proposed changes have accom-
Prison Discipline, 63 J. OF CRM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 200, 225-26 (1972);
Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls--Study of the Disciplinary Process in a Canadian
Penitentiary, 12 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 1 (1974); Note, Behind Closed Doors: An
Empirical Inquiry into the Nature of Prison Discipline in Georgia, 8 GA. L. REv. 919
(1974). The deposition of Harvard Wayne Harrelson in Murphy v. Wheaton, No. 74
C 405 (N.D. Ill., filed Feb. 2, 1974) indicated that while he was chairman of the disci-
plinary committee at Stateville from 1972 into 1975, it was not the habit of the commit-
tee to require testimony from the charging guard.
201. Ill. Dept. of Corrections Reg. § 845 (1975). Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974), recognizes that there may be some situations where to reveal the complain-
ing party's name would endanger his life or safety. But see McLaughlin v. Hall, 520
F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1975).
202. After the Sept. 6, 1973 disturbance in Cellhouse B at Stateville, over 150
inmates were cited for rule violations. The disciplinary reports on about half of these
inmates were able to be found and produced in Murphy v. Wheaton, No. 74 C 405 (N.D.
Ill., filed Feb. 12, 1974). In the vast majority of these (79 of 92), the disciplinary
committee indicated the factual basis of its decision by stating that it "accepted the facts
as stated" despite assurances that Illinois Department of Corrections Regulation § 804 as
in effect in July, 1973 prohibited such. Burbank v. Twomey, 520 F.2d 744, 747 (7th
Cir. 1975).
203. The addendum to the Brief for Appellee, Farnham v. Sielaff, No. 74 C 1934
(7th Cir., filed April 7, 1975) indicates that the grievance system gave some relief to the
inmates appearing before the third or departmental stage in 65 % of the cases.
204. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-2-2(g) (1975).
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plished their goal. The result of the implementation of the Justice Model
would be to shift the focus of inmate frustration from the parole board to
the prison disciplinary committee, rather than abate that frustration.
Programs
If the Justice Model is to truly give justice, it must undertake to provide
inmates with the opportunity to gain skills and abilities while incarcerated
which will permit them to gain employment upon release. Presently, the
Illinois Department of Corrections has as an official objective the rehabilita-
tion of those incarcerated. 205  The industrial and vocational programs are
supposedly operated to equip the inmate with marketable skills and to
promote work habits and responsibility. 20 6 Academic programs are designed
to provide high school and college level courses.20 7
The industrial program and the operation of the institution employ
most of the inmates. Some of these assignments are paid with wages in the
$.35 to $.55 per hour range. Other positions are unpaid, with the inmates
receiving remuneration in the form of compensatory good time.
208
The Justice Model bills do not deal extensively with institutional
programs. The only changes proposed in the present form of the legislation
are in the provisions relating to remuneration of inmates for work performed.
Express authority is given to pay the inmate a rate up to the prevailing
wage for similar work in the community. The provision is discretionary and
it does not require the payment of wages for any work performed while in
custody.209 The only other change is the abolition of compensatory good
time.
The present non-payment of wages for work performed in the institu-
tion is due in part to the unavailability of funds in the departmental budget
to make such payment. This situation is not expected to change with the
adoption of the Justice Model. Thus there exists the specter of those
inmates presently being remunerated in compensatory good time being
denied such remuneration without being guaranteed any other form of
remuneration. This does not appear to convey a sense of justice to the
inmate population.
205. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1001-1-2 (1975).
206. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1003-12-1, 1003-12-3 (1975).
207. ILL. REV. StAT. ch. 122, § 13-40 (1975) provides the authority therefor.
208. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-12-5 (1975).
209. Proposed ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1003-12-5 reads:
Sec. 3-12-5. Compensation.) Persons performing a work assignment un-
der paragraph (a) of Section 3-12-2 shall receive wages under rules and regu-
lations of the Department. In determining rates of compensation, the Depart-
ment shall consider the effort, skill and economic value of the work performed
and may compensate the persons performing it up to the prevailing wage
for similar labor. All wages shall be deposited in the individual's account
under rules and regulations of the Department.
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The removal of the parole process does not eliminate either the need or
the desirability of having programmatic services for the inmates. It would be
erroneous to assume that all inmates would avoid involvement in these
programs were the coercion of parole removed, and equally erroneous to
assume that inmates cannot benefit from such institutional programs. 210
While the removal of the parole process with its inherent coer-
civeness will make participation in programs more voluntary, there is
still the problem that the prison administration has a real need to keep
inmates occupied in some manner. Long periods of physical and mental
idleness coupled with the inherently unpleasant surroundings in the correc-
tional institution produce the same type of frustration which the parole
process produces and which the Justice Model is attempting to eliminate.
It is unfortunate that the proposed legislation does not undertake to
assure the improvement of the institutional programs. Earlier drafts of the
Justice Model legislation did propose an intricate system of "credits" to be
earned together with good time. These credits could, to a limited extent,
have been used to purchase commodities within the institutional economy
and could have been employed as a device to give the inmate some freedom
of choice in programmatic matters. While the draft legislation presented a
number of problems, it is unfortunate that the drafters decided to delete
these provisions.
211
The elimination of the parole process will ostensibly free the institution-
al staff from evaluating inmates' institutional progress for the parole board,
so that they can spend more time providing programmatic services. But this
group is far too small to constitute a substantial benefit to the inmate
population. At best, it will mean that there will be a few counselors and




Inmates just released from prison have a need for a variety of services.
These services include job counseling and placement, family and personal
counseling and other similar services.21 3  Ostensibly these services are
210. NEw RED BARN, supra note 151, at 138-39 (lack of revenue and programs);
Monius, supra note 5, at 28-31 (the coercive operation of contemporary prisons); Coa-
REcrioNs, supra note 162, at 350.
211. The proposal provided for each unit of good time to carry with it a credit to
which an economic value would be attached. These credits could to a limited extent be
converted into cash for use in the institutional economy; or as a form of unemployment
compensation after release. They could have been "spent" to elect programs within the
institution. There was the possibility that these credits could have been taken as
discipline. Unfortunately, this was deleted from the most recent draft of the legislation.
212. Presently the larger institutions simply do not have treating psychologists or
psychiatrists. The individuals employed devote their attention to diagnosis for the parole
board.
213. CobtCErToNs, supra note 162, at 430-31.
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presently provided by parole officers. In fact, the extent to which these
services are provided depends upon the parole officer's caseload and whether
he visualizes his role as one of a "helping person" or police officer.2 14 Since
inmates, with very few exceptions, must spend some time under supervision
before discharge from sentence, in theory parole is a vehicle for providing
aftercare services.
2 15
By eliminating parole supervision, the Justice Model would eliminate
this vehicle to re-entry and rehabilitation. To obviate this difficulty, the
drafters of the proposed changes included language which permits the
Department of Corrections (renamed the Bureau of Community Safety) to
provide such services.2 16  The language is discretionary, rather than manda-
tory.
The proposal permits needed services to be offered by the department
through its owyn employees or to be purchased from community resources
where the department is unable to provide the services. A purchase of serv-
ices could only be effected where the releasee is unable to afford the cost
of the service. Additionally, the department would be permitted to assess




215. Every felon sentenced after the effective date of the Unified Code of Correc-
tions has a mandatory parole term under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1(e) (1975).
216. Proposed ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 1006-6-1 and 1006-6-2 read:
Sec. 6-6-1. Services to Persons on Parole or Release.) (a) The Bureau
shall provide services to persons released from prison or placed on parole,
or mandatory release and shall supervise such persons during their parole
or release period in accord with the conditions set.
(b)The Bureau shall assign personnel to assist persons eligible for insti-
tutional parole or mandatory release in preparing a community living plan.
Such Department personnel shall make a report of their efforts and findings
to the Bureau prior to, or at the time of transference to the authority of
the Bureau.
(c) The supervising officer of the Bureau shall regularly advise and con-
sult with the parolee or releasee, assist him in adjusting to community life,
and inform him of the restoration of his rights on successful completion of
sentence under Section 1005-5-5.
(d) The supervising officer shall keep such records as may be required
by rules and regulations of the Bureau. All records shall be entered in the
master file of the individual.
Sec. 6-6-2. Post Release Services.) To assist parolees or releasees the
Bureau of offender control may, in addition to other services, provide the
following:
(1) employment counseling, job placement, and assistance in residential
placement;
(2) family and individual counseling and treatment placement;
(3) financial counseling;
(4) vocational and educational counseling and placement; and
(5) referral services to any other State or local agencies.
The Bureau may purchase necessary services for a parolee or releasee if they
are otherwise unavailable and the parolee or releasee is unable to pay for
them. It may assess all or part of the costs of such services to a parolee or
releasee in accordance with his ability to pay for them.
217. This runs into the inevitable problem of determining ability to pay. See, e.g.,
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While the need for these services is obvious, it appears the provision of
these services would be one of the lowest priorities of the Department of
Corrections. Attempting to charge the releasee for these services is completely
unrealistic. The need for these services occurs in the immediate post-release
period. If the individual has been able to amass any amount of money
during his term of incarceration, it is probable that he will need it to carry
him through the first few months after release. The adoption of rational
guidelines for the determination of ability to pay would result in the
exclusion of most releasees from payment, rendering the process meaningless.
Attempts to charge would tend to inhibit the releasees from utilizing these
services.
A better solution might be to define the period when services would be
rendered or at least commenced to include the first six or nine months
following release. Thereafter, the individuals would have to use other
agencies or pay the full cost of the services provided through the Department
of Corrections.
SOME CONCLUDING ASSESSMENTS
The Justice Model proposal for a return to flat time sentences involves
Illinois in a wide variety of changes, all directed toward the purpose of
reducing prison term disparity by controlling or eliminating official discre-
tion. Insofar as these changes recognize and build upon the documented
weaknesses of the indeterminate sentencing structure in Illinois, they are
mandates for serious attention by the General Assembly. However, in
attacking the problems set out by the critics of the indeterminate sentence,
the Justice Model also creates some problems of its own.
A general point that seems relevant here is the legislative form which
the Justice Model bills take. While the individual measures per se might be
regarded as providing answers to problems of criminal justice in Illinois, it
appears they are intended to be an integrated, total reform package since
they propose to alter the central and defining elements of the present system.
But the bills are, for the most part, merely amendatory of present legisla-
tion.218 The problem with this approach is that the drafters simply have not
considered many of the interrelated parts of the Code of Corrections of 1973
supposedly left untouched by the amendments. Because the central system
of the Code has been changed, all interrelated parts of the law will be
affected. To give only the most glaring example of this change, plea
bargaining under the determinate sentencing structure will be radically
Grimes v. State, 278 N.E.2d 271 (Sup. Ct. Ind. 1972); Samuel v. United States, 420 F.2d
371 (5th Cir. 1969).
218. The Determinate Sentencing bill is entirely amendatory. The other two bills,
supra note 1, on Sentencing Equalization and the Bureau of Community Safety, are new
legislation. They do, however, fit into the legislative framework of the Code of
Corrections of 1973.
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affected. The bills do not address this problem. The answer seems to lie in
a much more extensive reworking of the Code of Corrections, or at least a
careful consideration of major implications of the changes. The drafters
appear to have chosen the path of least resistance by amending only those
sections of the Code directly affected.
In addition, the overriding problem of goal conflict has not been
adequately addressed by the Justice Model bills. The Model proposes a
punishment-equality approach, yet retains a dangerousness and rehabilitation
element. While consensus on what goals are proper and how they are to be
ordered is not currently possible, 219 a reasonable solution lies in an attempt
at revising and unifying present goal statements contained in the criminal
codes of the state. 22 0  This should leave open questions not resolved such
as the potential conflict between retributive goals and deterrent ones,
221
but it should deal forthrightly with ones that can be resolved, for example,
the removal of rehabilitative goals as the primary ones for corrections.
222
The lacunae which this statement might contain should be left to the
courts to fill in on a case by case basis. Thus, both trial and appellate courts
should be forced to express their reasons for imposing certain sentences. 223
The sentencing criteria would be important, but not in the rigid form
proposed by the Justice Model. There would be no quarrel if the criteria
were mandating but not exclusive, that is, that courts could gradually add to
the list in light of the goal statement. Plea bargaining should be brought into
line with both the goal statement and the criteria for sentences. The prac-
tice desperately needs some guidance beyond the exigencies of the docket.
219. The debate on goals is wide-ranging and intricate. There is no single biblio-
graphical source for all of it. One of the authors has summarized parts of the debate in
an earlier article that may be helpful. Gerber & McAnany, Philosophy of Criminal Law
and Punishment, in JOHNSON, SAvrrs & WOLFGANG, THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT AND
CORRECTIONS 337-61 (2d ed. 1970).
220. There are three formal goal sections in the present chapter 38: ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, §§ 1-2, 101-1, 1001-1-2(1975). The Illinois Constitution also contains principles
that are important here. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 11. An attempt at revising the goal
statements was made in drafting the Code of Corrections, but the Council on Diagnosis,
the reviewing body, rejected the effort as too complicated. For a review of such a goal
statement contained in the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, see Hart, The
Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L & CONTEMPORARY PROB. 401 (1958).
221. The debate involves the shift in emphasis from past offense of an individual
offender to prevention of future offenses by other potential offenders. It does not, as
such, raise the same questions as a social defense philosophy of restraint of dangerous-
ness. For an intelligent treatment of the conflict, see PACKER, THE LMTrrs OF THE
CRIMINAL SANCTION PART I (1968).
222. Many critics are currently advocating this position. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR
JUSTICE, supra note 5; FOGEL, supra note 1, at 50-62; Silving, A Plea for a New
Philosophy of Criminal Justice, 35 REVISTA DE JURID. DE U. PUERTO RICO 401 (1966).
223. Unarticulated reversals of lower court sentences would leave them in the dark
and allow goals to continue unordered. For a similar experience with the Connecticut
appellate courts, see Note, Appellate Review of Sentencing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379
(1964).
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There is reason to believe that the present assignment of offenses to
classes also needs revising, though the Justice Model does not explicitly
recognize this fact. If proportionality is made the basis of the sentencing
process, care should be taken to frequently review the degree of public
condemnation a particular offense entails. The Code of Corrections by-
passed this challenging task and merely assigned offenses to classes on the
basis of their then current penalties.
2 24
Together with this reassessment of classes of offenses, the legislature
might consider ordering, in degree of seriousness, the penalties themselves.
While it is true that there already exists some general sense of gradation of
seriousness from death through imprisonment to fines, there is need to make
the order explicit, especially in making imprisonment the last, or most
restrictive, alternative. 22 1  The death penalty, already subject to serious
doubt, should be eliminated.
If determinate terms are finally proven more reconcilable with the goal
statement, as the authors believe they will be, a very careful examination
should be made as to length and its effect on present prison population, as
well as jail population. If Illinois chooses to return to more universal, short
prison terms, then the total prison system as it has developed---or failed to
develop--should be re-examined to accommodate the change. 226  Another
way to handle the dangerous offender must be found in order to make clear
that the criminal law system deals with past offenses, not future ones.
Appellate review of sentences as set out by the Justice Model bill is
acceptable if the state's right to appeal is either adequately curtailed or
altogether eliminated. The Justice Model approach makes too broad a
concession to the state which is unnecessary in light of the other mechanisms
available for control of lenient judges. In any event, an appropriate law on
appellate review should conform to the goal statement and also help to
formulate it in an ongoing fashion.
Statewide criminal justice statistics, suggested as a part of appellate
review, should be broadened to include all phases 'of the criminal justice
process and a neutral agency mandated to collect and collate them. 227
Making the Department of Corrections responsible seems unwarranted be-
cause it is the agency most likely to be affected by outcome of sentencing.
224. The drafters simply aligned then current penalties with proposed classifications,
making a few minor adjustments. See THE COUNCIL ON THE DIAGNOSIS AND EVALUATION
OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS, TENTATIVE FINAL DIAFT, ILLINOIS UNIFIED CODE OF COR-
RECKONS, Appendix A (1971).
225. For a general discussion of the role of the legislature in sentencing, see
CORRECrtiONS, supra note 162, at 143-47.
226. Similar recommendations have been brought forward by the Committee for the
Study of Incarceration. Chicago Daily News, Feb. 18, 1976, at 30, cols. 1 & 2.
227. For a model, one could look to the State of California where a division of the
Attorney General's Office has been given such a mandate. See CALIF. PENAL CODE §§
11075, 1330 (West 1976 Supp.)
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Should -the state elect a determinate sentencing approach, parole release
would be abolished. The authors feel that even with the best efforts of
courts overseeing the parole release process, there is faint chance that the
decision will be anything but arbitrary. But parole supervision might be
retained as some public guarantee that the imprisoning agency will provide
for the return of offenders to community life. This would also mandate the
appropriation of money for needed services through the agency, rather than
leaving it to the vagaries of local effort. 228  But the supervision period could
be relatively short and free of oppressive techniques of control as exercised
in the past.
Prison and jail discipline becomes a major focus under the Justice
Model since flat time sentences are reduced only by good time provisions
which affect amount of good time earned or retained. A disciplinary
committee which functions outside the operating personnel of the prison is
required. Present law gives rather clear guidelines for an adequate justice
system at this level. It needs only to be implemented so that the difficult
decision of punishing prisoners is not thrust on the very officers responsible
for the institution.
Finally, voluntary programs of rehabilitation should be part of any
changeover to determinate sentencing. To date, rehabilitation has failed.
The reasons for this failure are inconclusive. But evidently the resources
or motivation, or both, have been lacking. If the Justice Model's notion of a
credit-voucher system can be evaluated and tested for effectiveness, it might
provide an answer. But pure punishment without recognition that change is
implied in that term will simply not work, nor would it be acceptable to most
of the public.
229
The Justice Model has taken serious strides toward several of these
goals. It has not been entirely successful in its efforts. This article has
attempted an analysis of the problems addressed and the remedies offered.
It has made what it saw as reasonable criticism for inadequate answers and
has ended by sketching some alternatives to these weaknesses. In the end,
the authors are encouraged that the Justice Model has undertaken the
address of serious problems of justice in our system and that the criticism
offered here will be constructive of a better and more just future for the use
of the criminal sanction.
228. The article has not discussed the merits of the proposal of a statewide
probation agency, the Bureau of Community Safety, as a division of the Illinois
Department of Corrections. There are several advantages to this statewide approach,
but all efforts in this direction have been defeated in the legislature. But beyond these
political feasibility problems, there may be issues of freedom and effectiveness which
need to be considered before we go to a statewide system. See McAnany, Recommenda-
tions for Improving the Ailing Probation System in GERBER, CONTEMPORARY IssuEs IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: SOME PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED REFORMS 76-93 (1976).
229. Punishment as revenge is unacceptable. But this is clearly distinguishable from
retributive punishment which recognizes the fact that condemnation of wrongdoing
entails return to community. See generally GERBER & MCANANY, note 68 supra.
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